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THE LIBYAN ASSET FREEZE AND ITS APPLICATION
TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENT DEPOSITS IN OVERSEAS
BRANCHES OF UNITED STATES BANKS: LIBYAN
ARAB FOREIGN BANK v. BANKERS TRUST CO.
Corinne R. Rutzke*
INTRODUCTION
United States asset freezes are political weapons invoked in response
to international crises.' Traditionally, United States asset freezes have
blocked foreign government assets within the jurisdiction of the United
States.2 Following the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis, however, United
States peacetime asset freezes have attempted to block dollar-denomi-
nated accounts3 held in foreign brancheS4 of United States banks.5 An
important legal issue associated with the use of peacetime blocking
* J.D. Candidate, 1988, Washington College of Law, The American University.
1. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, BLOCKED FOREIGN ASSETS IN THE
UNITED STATES 1, 3 (1985) [hereinafter TREASURY PAMPHLET]. Historically, the
blocking control orders, promulgated pursuant to section 5(b) of the Trading with the
Enemy Act, authorized the President to regulate or prohibit any property transaction
involving a foreign country or national during wartime. Trading with the Enemy Act of
1917, 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(1)(B) (1982). Following the entry of the People's Repub-
lic of China into the Korean War in 1950, President Truman blocked Chinese and
North Korean property within the jurisdiction of the United States. The Management
of Blocked Foreign Assets in the United States, 12 INT'L CURRENCY Rzv. 37, 38 (No.
6 1980). Expanding the scope of the Trading with the Enemy Act, the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 permits the President, in peacetime, to nul-
lify or prohibit any transfer or withdrawal of property where a foreign country or na-
tional has any interest. International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977, 50
U.S.C. § 1702 (a)(1)(B) (1982). Blocking controls, however, are not always employed
as weapons against the assets of hostile governments. See Exec. Order No. 8,389, 3
C.F.R. § 644-45 (1940) (invoking the Trading with the Enemy Act to freeze the assets
of the Norwegian and Danish governments). President Roosevelt invoked section 5(b)
of the Trading with the Enemy Act to prevent the government of Nazi Germany from
seizing the overseas assets of the vanquished Norwegian and Danish governments. Id.
2. Carswell & Davis, Crafting the Financial Settlement, in AMERICAN HOSTAGES
IN IRAN 232-33 (P. Kreisberg ed. 1985) [hereinafter Financial Settlement].
3. See infra note 7 (explaining that foreign dollar-denominated accounts are rou-
tinely labeled as Eurodollar deposits).
4. See Lichtenstein, U.S. Banks and the Eurocurrency Markets: The Regulatory
Structure, 99 BANKING L.J. 484, 493 n.25 (1982) (discussing the definition of "foreign
branches").
5. See Carswell & Davis, The Economic and Financial Pressures: Freeze and
Sanctions, in AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN 178 (P. Kreisberg ed. 1985) [hereinafter
Economic and Financial Pressures] (describing the unprecedented blocking of Iranian
government assets held in foreign branches of United States banks).
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controls is whether the United States can use asset freezes to reach
dollar-denominated accounts held in financial institutions outside the
jurisdiction of the United States.6 Two recent cases involving peacetime
asset freezes directed at Iranian and Libyan Eurodollar7 accounts ex-
amined this question.
President Carter, on November 14, 1979, declared a national emer-
gency and froze all Iranian assets within or subject to United States
jurisdiction, including all Iranian dollar-denominated accounts held in
foreign branches of United States banks.8 Subsequently, the Iranian
Central Bank, Bank Markazi Iran, sued the London branches of five
United States banks9 and the Paris branches of two United States
banks10 to recover the frozen Iranian Eurodollar accounts. The Algier-
ian Accords between the United States and Iran, however, precluded
the British and French courts from ruling on the legality of the extra-
territorial application of a United States asset freeze.1
6. Cutler, Luncheon Address, 1980 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROc. 43, 45; see Financial
Times, Oct. 18, 1986, at 4, col. 1 (remarking that no court has ever ruled on the
extraterritorial effect of a United States asset freeze).
7. See Hoffman & Giddy, Lessons from the Iranian Experience: National Curren-
cies as International Money, 3 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 73, 76 (1981) (defin-
ing a Eurodollar account as a dollar-denominated bank deposit held in a bank outside
the United States).
8. See Exec. Order No. 12,170, 3 C.F.R. § 457 (1980), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. §
1701 app. at 148 (1982) (ordering the blocking of all Iranian assets that come within
the control of United States persons); Exec. Order No. 12,211, 45 Fed. Reg. 26,685
(1980), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 app. at 149-50 (1982) (prohibiting the payment
or transfer of funds to Iran); see also Economic and Financial Pressures, supra note 5,
at 178-79 (noting that the Iranian asset freeze applied to Iranian Eurodollar accounts
held in foreign branches of United States banks). President Carter ordered the Iranian
asset freeze following the seizure of the United States embassy in Tehran. Id. at 175-
77.
9. See Edwards, Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Iranian Assets Control
Regulations, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 870, 876 (1981) (noting that Bank Markazi Iran sued
the London branches of Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association,
Bankers Trust Company, Chase Manhattan Bank N.A., Citibank N.A., and Manufac-
turer's Hanover Trust Co. to recover Iranian government deposits).
10. See id. at 876 (stating that Bank Markazi Iran sued the Paris branches of
Citibank and Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association).
11. Id. at 870. The Algiers Accords provided for the release of American diplo-
matic and consular personnel from Iran. TREASURY PAMPHLET, supra note 1, at 29.
The United States subsequently agreed to transfer all Iranian assets held in overseas
branches of United States banks and in foreign branches of United States banks to the
Algerian Central Bank in exchange for the release of the hostages. Declaration of the
Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, Jan. 19, 1981, re-
printed in 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 418, 418 (1981). The United States and Iran also agreed
to establish an Iran-United States Claims Tribunal to adjudicate the claims of United
States nationals against the United States. Declaration of the Government of the Dem-
ocratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Re-
public of Iran, Jan. 19, 1981, reprinted in 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 422, 422 (1981). See
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On January 8, 1986, President Reagan, responding to Libyan threats
against United States security and foreign policy interests, 2 froze all
dollar-denominated assets of the Libyan government including assets
held in foreign branches of United States banks.13 Following the an-
nouncement of the Libyan asset freeze, the Libyan Arab Foreign Bank
(LAFB) 4 requested the London branch of Bankers Trust Company to
Carter, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. Observations on the First Year, 29
UCLA L. REV. 1076, 1076-80, 1085-92 (1982) (discussing the creation of the new
arbitral body and the reliance on the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law Rules (UNCITRAL) to provide the adjudicating framework of the
Tribunal).
12. See Presidential Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President of the
Senate Concerning the Libyan National Emergency, 22 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 21
(Jan. 13, 1986) (stating that the President authorized sanctions under emergency de-
cree in response to Libyan support of international terrorism); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
SPECIAL REPORT No. 138, LIBYA UNDER QUADHAFI: A PATTERN OF AGGRESSION 6
(1986) (noting the Libyan involvement in terrorism); N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1986, at A6,
col. 1 (reporting the Reagan administration's assertion that Libya sponsored terrorist
attacks at the Rome and Vienna airports on December 27, 1985, where five Americans
died). The Libyan government, however, vehemently denied this accusation. Wash.
Post, Aug. 31, 1986, at A25, col. 1.
13. Exec. Order No. 12,544, 3 C.F.R. § 183 (1987), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. §
1701 app. at 269 (Vest Supp. 1987). President Reagan issued Executive Order No.
12,544, declaring an emergency, pursuant to the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act. Id. This act authorizes the declaration of an emergency if an event outside
the United States constitutes an extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign
policy, or economy of the United States. International Emergency Economic Powers
Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (1982). Prior to ordering the Libyan asset freeze, President
Reagan prohibited United States citizens from trading with and traveling to Libya.
Exec. Order No. 12,543, 3 C.F.R. § 181 (1987) reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701 app.
at 268 (West Supp. 1987). The precise rationale behind the asset freeze is unknown.
Compare Wash. Post, Jan. 9, 1986, at Al, col. 5 (stating that the perceived Libyan
withdrawal of dollar-denominated assets from United States banks, following the an-
nouncement of Libyan trade and travel sanctions on January 7, 1986, was a motivating
factor behind the asset freeze) with Wall St. J., Jan. 9, 1986, at 6, col. I (proclaiming
that the major reason for the freeze was to prevent Libya from collecting on American
corporation bonds, guaranteeing performance of obligations arising under contracts
with the Libyan government). The sanctions of January 7, 1986 rendered the perform-
ance of these contractual obligations impossible. Id.
14. See Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., [1986] L. No. 1567/L.
No. 4048 (Q.B.) 1, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1600, 1603 (1987) (describing the Libyan
Arab Foreign Bank as a Libyan corporation wholly owned by the Central Bank of
Libya). The Libyan Arab Foreign Bank (LAFB) on May 13, 1986 commenced an
action, L. No. 1567, in the High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, Commercial
Court, demanding repayment of $131 million held in Bankers Trust Company's
London account. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., [19861 L. No. 1567
(Q.B.) 2. Justice Evans, of the High Court of Justice, found for the LAFB on its sum-
mary judgment motion and ruled that Bankers Trust Company must repay the funds.
Id. at 3. Bankers Trust Company appealed this ruling to the Supreme Court of Judica-
ture, Court of Appeal. Id. at 1, 2. The Court of Appeal, on December 19, 1986, re-
versed the ruling of Judge Evans, remanding the case back to the High Court of Jus-
tice. Id. at 21.
The LAFB, on December 23, 1986, sent a telex to Bankers Trust Company, de-
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repay all funds held in the LAFB's London account.Y5 Bankers Trust
Company refused to comply with this demand, claiming that the newly
instituted asset freeze blocked the requested funds."8 Consequently, on
May 13, 1986, the LAFB sued Bankers Trust Company to recover the
balance of the account held in the London bank.1"
Both the Iranian and Libyan situations expose the potential dilemma
facing the foreign branches of United States banks subject to executive
orders freezing dollar-denominated deposit accounts. Repayment of
Eurodollar deposit accounts held in foreign branches of United States
banks exposes the parent bank to criminal liability under United States
law.18 If demands for repayment of frozen accounts are denied, how-
ever, United States banks face costly lawsuits and a potential loss of
depositor confidence. 9 This Case-Comment examines two arguments,
the Eurodollar defense and the IMF defense, available to United States
banks defending against claims for repayment of frozen Eurodollar
accounts.
After providing a chronology of Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bank-
ers Trust Co.,20 this Case-Comment analyzes Bankers Trust Com-
pany's assertion that an implied term of the banking relationship, de-
rived from the operation of the Eurodollar market, excuses Bankers
Trust Company from honoring the LAFB's demand for repayment.
manding payment again of $131 million and $161 million respectively. Libyan Arab
Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., [1986] L. No. 1567/L. No. 4048 (Q.B.) 17-18,
reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1600, 1611-12 (1987). When Bankers Trust Company did not
honor the demand, the LAFB commenced a second action, L. No. 4048 in the High
Court of Justice. Id. at 18. The High Court of Justice, on January 19, 1987, ordered L.
No. 1567 and L. No. 4048 consolidated. Id. at 1, 18.
15. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., [1986] L. No. 1567/L. No.
4048 (Q.B.) 17-18, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1600, 1611-12 (1987).
16. Id. at 17.
17. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., [1986] L. No. 1567 (Q.B.) 2.
18. Exec. Order No. 12,544, 3 C.F.R. § 183 (1987), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. §
1701 app. at 269 (West Supp. 1987). The penalties for violating the provisions of the
Libyan Sanctions Regulations are derived from section 206 of the International Emer-
gency Economic Powers Act. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50
U.S.C. § 1705 (1982). Id. Section 206 states that violations of regulations promulgated
under the Act are punishable by a civil penalty of not more than $10,000. Id. Willful
violation of regulations promulgated under the Act are punishable by fines of not more
than $50,000. Id. A natural person who willfully violates provisions of regulations is-
sued pursuant to the Act is subject to imprisonment for no less than 10 years. Id. The
Act will impose a similar penalty on an officer, director, or agent of a corporation that
willfully violates regulations issued under the Act. Id.
19. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text (providing examples of the law
suits that ensue following a bank's refusal to honor demands for repayment of Eurodol-
lar deposits).
20. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., [1986] L. No. 1567/L. No.
4048 (Q.B.) I, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1600, 1603 (1987).
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The implied term of the banking relationship, Bankers Trust Company
contended, requires that repayment take place through processing sys-
tems in New York.21 Use of these systems, Bankers Trust Company
argued, requires actions in New York that are illegal under United
States law.22 Bankers Trust Company, therefore, claimed that the Brit-
ish doctrine of impossibility excused the bank from honoring the
LAFB's demand for repayment.
23
This Case-Comment also examines a second possible defense availa-
ble to foreign branches of United States banks holding frozen Eurodol-
lar accounts. This argument, based on article VIII, section 2(b)2 of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) Agreement, states that when the
United States government freezes Eurodollar accounts, United States
banks may claim that the accounts are actually exchange contracts in-
volving United States currency.2 5 Performance of the obligations aris-
ing under these exchange contracts, particularly the repayment obliga-
tions of the United States bank, would violate United States exchange
control regulations promulgated in compliance with the IMF Agree-
ment.26 Consequently, under article VIII, section 2(b), neither Libya
nor any other member of the IMF can seek to enforce these con-
tracts.2 7 In Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co.,23 how-
ever, this IMF defense was inapplicable. In future litigation this ar-
gument may provide a viable defense for foreign branches of United
21. Id. at 3.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 19.
24. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, 60
Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39 [hereinafter Agreement], reprinted in
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT 24 (1985).
25. See Bank Markazi Iran v. Bank of America, [1979] L. No. 5955 (Q.B.) 6,
reprinted in IRANIAN ASSETS LITIGATION REPORTER 1028, 1033 (June 20, 1980) (rais-
ing the IMF defense in the context of the Iranian assets freeze litigation).
26. Edwards, supra note 9, at 881, 883.
27. See Decision No. 446-4, June 10, 1949, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND,
SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND SELECTED DoCu-
MENTS 251 (11th issue 1985) [hereinafter SELECTED DECISIONS] (stating that if the
requirements of article VIII, section 2(b) are fulfilled, judicial authorities of member
countries should not assist other countries in circumventing valid exchange control re-
strictions, either through decreeing performance of contracts or awarding damages for
their nonperformance); see also 2 A. DICEY & I. MORRIS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
1028 (10th ed. 1980) (noting that article VIII, section 2(b) transcends the general
principles of conflict of laws). Therefore, if all the elements of article VIII, section 2(b)
are met, British courts cannot enforce a Eurodollar deposit contract even if the place of
performance is the United Kingdom, and British law governs the contract. SELECTED
DECISIONS, supra, at 252.
28. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., [1986] L. No. 1567 (Q.B.) 1.
29. Id. at 4-5 (noting that Bankers Trust Company did not raise the IMF defense
in the context of the Libyan litigation).
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States banks holding frozen Eurodollar accounts.
I. LIBYAN ARAB FOREIGN BANK V. BANKERS TRUST
CO.
A. THE BANKING RELATIONSHIP
The LAFB opened a seven-day notice account 0 with the London
branch of Bankers Trust Company in April 1973.31 Although a notice
account, the investors used the London account primarily as a current
account 32 with interest paid on the balance. 33 In November 1977,
Bankers Trust Company, dissatisfied with the operational difficulties
and profit-generating capability of the LAFB's account, proposed the
establishment of a managed account system, -consisting of a current ac-
count with the New York office, and a call account with the London
office.34 The LAFB, however, rejected the managed account proposal.3
Bankers Trust Company revived the managed account system propo-
sal in 1980 and reached an agreement with the LAFB on December 11,
1980.36 The managed account agreement established a demand account
in New York with a peg or target balance of $500,000 and a call ac-
count in London.17 The agreement mandated that all LAFB transac-
tions pass through the New York account.38 At the beginning of each
banking day, the agreement required the New York office of Bankers
Trust Company to determine the closing balance of the New York ac-
30. See M. STIGUM, THE MONEY MARKET MYTH, REALITY AND PRACTICE 551
(1978) (characterizing call accounts as accounts that bear interest and require twenty-
four hours notice prior to withdrawal).
31. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., [1986] L. No. 1567/L. No.
4048 (Q.B.) 5, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1600, 1605 (1987).
32. Id. at 6.
33. Id. The terms of the deposit contract required the LAFB to give seven days
notice prior to making withdrawals from the account. Id. at 5. Bankers Trust Com-
pany, however, never required the LAFB to adhere to this requirement. Id.
34. Id at 6-7.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 7-9.
37. Id. at 9. A peg or target balance is a predetermined floor that mandates a
minimum account balance. Id. at 7. The value of the peg balance reflects the amount
necessary to compensate adequately Bankers Trust Company for its services. Id. The
London account was denominated in Eurodollars. Id. at 9. A Eurodollar account is
simply an account, located outside the United States, denominated in United States
dollars. 9 L. WEERAMANTRY & W. SCHLICHTING, BANKING LAW § 211.05 (1986).
38. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., [1986] L. No. 1567/L. No.
4048 (Q.B.) 8-9, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1600, 1607 (1987). Although the managed
account arrangement did not contain explicit terms requiring the clearing of all trans-
actions through the New York account, the court held that such a term was implied
from the course of the negotiations establishing the arrangement. Id.
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count for the previous day.3 If the closing balance exceeded the peg or
target balance, the agreement obligated the New York branch of Bank-
ers Trust Company to transfer the excess amount to the London ac-
count.40 Conversely, if the New York account balance fell below the
peg balance, an appropriate transfer was made from the London ac-
count to the LAFB account in New York.41 Thus, the London account
actually functioned as an interest bearing reservoir for the New York
account.4 During the period of the LAFB's managed account system
from December 1980 to December 1985, the relationship between
Libya and the United States gradually deteriorated. 3
On December 27, 1985, terrorist attacks at the Rome and Vienna
airports exacerbated already strained relations between Libya and the
United States." On the afternoon of January 7, 1986, Mr. Corrigan,
the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, contacted Mr.
Brittain, the Chairman of Bankers Trust Company, to ascertain
whether the Libyans removed funds from their bank accounts in the
United States.45 Mr. Brittain, after reviewing the account records, in-
formed officials at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York that the
Libyans had withdrawn funds from the United States. 0 Mr. Corrigan
requested that Mr. Brittain temporarily halt all payments out of the
Libyan accounts.47 Following further discussions with Mr. Corrigan,
Mr. Brittain contacted Treasury Secretary James A. Baker III to dis-
cuss the LAFB account.48 Treasury Secretary Baker told Mr. Brittain
39. Id. at 7-9.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., [1986] L. No. 1567 (Q.B.) 8.
Bankers Trust Company unilaterally altered the terms of the managed account ar-
rangement in April 1984. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., [19861 L.
No. 1567/L. No. 4048 (Q.B.) 10, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1600, 1608 (1987). This
modification effectively deprived the LAFB of one day's interest. Id. The complaint of
LAFB included a breach of contract claim arising out of this modification. Id. at 3-5.
43. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., [1986] L. No. 1567/L. No.
4048 (Q.B.) 9-10, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1600, 1607-08 (1987).
44. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1986, at A6, col. I (stating the Reagan administration
position that the Libyan government was responsible for the attacks at the Rome and
Vienna airports).
45. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., [1986] L. No. 1567/L. No.
4048 (Q.B.) 13, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1600, 1609 (1987).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 14. When Bankers Trust Company learned that the LAFB made deposits
into its New York accounts, Mr. Brittain contacted the Federal Reserve Bank in New
York and informed officials that Bankers Trust Company would resume honoring the
payment instructions of the LAFB. Id. Mr. Corrigan advised Mr. Brittain to contact
Treasury Secretary Baker before making payments out of the Libyan accounts. Id.
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that President Reagan had recently signed Executive Order No.
12,544,"1 rendering it illegal for Bankers Trust Company or any other
American bank to make any payments out of Libyan accounts."
The LAFB, on April 28, 1986, sent two telexes to Bankers Trust
Company's London branch.5 1 The first telex demanded repayment of
the $131 million balance in the London account, and the second telex
demanded repayment of the $161 million into the London account on
January 8, 1986 based on Bankers Trust Company's obligation to
transfer excess funds pursuant to the managed account agreement.52
Bankers Trust Company refused to honor either demand, arguing that
Executive Order No. 12,544 blocked the transfers.5 3 The LAFB, on
December 23, 1986, made a final demand for repayment of the London
account balance. 4 Once again, Bankers Trust Company refused the
demand for repayment, claiming that honoring the demand would vio-
late United States law.5 Following this refusal, the LAFB initiated
suit against Bankers Trust Company in the United Kingdom."'
49. See Exec. Order No. 12,544, 3 C.F.R. § 183 (1987), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A.
§ 1701 app. at 269 (West Supp. 1987) (freezing Libyan assets within the control of
United States citizens).
50. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., [1986] L. No. 1567/L. No.
4048 (Q.B.) 14, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1600, 1610 (1987). At the time of the freeze,
the balance of the London account totalled approximately $131 million. Id. at 4, 17.
The balance of the New York account at 2:00 p.m. on January 8, 1986, after sub-
tracting the peg balance, totalled approximately $161.4 million. Id. at 12. According to
the terms of the modified managed account arrangement, the bank should have trans-
ferred this sum to the London account at 2:00 p.m on January 8, 1986. Id. at 17. The
court concluded that if Bankers Trust Company had complied with the terms of the
modified managed account arrangement, the balance of the London account at the
time of the freeze would have totalled approximately $292 million. Id. at 58.
51. Id. at 17.
52. Id; see I W. SCHLICHTING, J. RICE & J. COOPER, BANKING LAW, § 9.05
(1987) [hereinafter BANKING LAW] (noting that a demand for repayment is essential
to enforcing an obligation of the depositing bank).
53. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., [1986] L. No. 1567/L. No.
4048 (Q.B.) 17, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1600, 1611 (1987). Bankers Trust Company
claimed that honoring the demands for repayment would violate the executive order
and the regulations promulgated pursuant to it. Id.
54. Id. at 17-18. The LAFB demanded payment in United States dollars or in ster-
ling. Id.
55. Id. at 17.
56. See id. at 4-5 (listing the LAFB's six claims against Bankers Trust Company).
The two principal claims involved the precise balance of the London account on Janu-
ary 8, 1986 and whether the LAFB was entitled to demand repayment of the London
account balance. Id. at 4. This Case-Comment focuses exclusively on the latter claim




B. THE ISSUES OF THE SUIT
1. The Conflict of Laws Threshold
In Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., 7 the court be-
gan its examination of the case with a review of the rules governing the
conflict of laws.58 Under English law, Bankers Trust Company is ex-
cused from its contractual obligations to honor the LAFB's demands
for repayment of the dollar-denominated London account, if repayment
is illegal under the proper substantive law governing the managed ac-
count system.59 Additionally, if repayment is not illegal under the
proper substantive law of the contract, Bankers Trust Company is still
excused from honoring the LAFB's demand for repayment of the
London account balance when repayment "necessarily" requires per-
formance of an act in a place where performance of that act is illegal. 0
Bankers Trust Company asserted that New York law was the proper
substantive law governing the managed account arrangement.6" Bank-
ers Trust Company contended that because New York law renders any
payments out of the accounts illegal, a bank was excused from honor-
ing the LAFB's demands for repayment of the London account bal-
ance.62 Thus, the British court was faced with the threshold question of
whether the laws of New York or the laws of the United Kingdom
were the proper substantive laws governing the managed account
arrangement.
In a conflict of laws scenario, a court usually applies the law of the
forum to determine how to properly characterize the case.63 Under the
laws of the United Kingdom, deposit arrangements are characterized
as contracts." Determining the proper substantive law governing a con-
tract requires a court to apply the entire body of the forum's conflict of
laws rules.6 5 In the absence of a contractual choice of law clause, Brit-
ish courts look to the circumstances surrounding the establishment of
the deposit contract to infer the intentions of the parties as to the appli-
57. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., [1986] L. No. 1567/L. No.
4048 (Q.B.), reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1600 (1987).
58. Id. at 3.
59. Id. at 19.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 3.
62. Id.
63. See A. DICEY & I. MORRIS, supra note 27, at 474-84 (stating that a court, in
determining the nature of the case before it, will usually look to the law of the forum).
64. F. PERRY, LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO BANKING 53 (3d ed. 1981); T.
REEDAY, THE LAW RELATING TO BANKING 1 (3d ed. 1976).
65. R. GOODE, COMMERCIAL LAW 913-14 (1982).
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cable substantive law. 6 As with most Eurodollar deposit arrangements,
the agreement between the LAFB and Bankers Trust Company did not
contain a choice of law clause, nor were the intentions of the parties
ascertainable from objective factors.61 In these types of situations, the
critical factor determining the proper law governing the contract is the
doctrine of lex situs, the law of the place where the deposit is kept.0 s
Applying the doctrine of lex situs, the court concluded that the man-
aged account arrangement had two distinct components: the New York
demand account and the London call account.6 The court found that
although the laws of New York were the proper substantive laws gov-
erning the New York account,' 0 the laws of the United Kingdom were
the proper substantive laws governing the London account.7 1 Therefore,
because the executive order freezing the LAFB's accounts was not in-
corporated into English law,7 2 the court concluded that repayment of
the London account balance was not illegal under the proper substan-
tive law governing the contract. Bankers Trust Company, therefore,
was not excused from honoring the LAFB's demands for repayment of
the London account balance.7 3
2. The Eurodollar Defense
In addition to the conflict of laws issue, the English court also evalu-
ated the Eurodollar defense Bankers Trust Company presented. The
crux of the Eurodollar defense is that the repayment of the LAFB's
Eurodollar account in London cannot occur without the use of the pay-
66. 1. CHITTY, CONTRACTS 1168-70 (25th ed. 1983).
67. See Carreau, The Legal Aspects of International Deposit Contracts, in INTER-
NATIONAL CONTRACTS 157-60 (Smith ed. 1981) (stating that ordinarily Eurodollar de-
posit contracts contain neither choice of law clauses nor provide an objective basis for
ascertaining the intentions of the parties); see also Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bank-
ers Trust Co., [1986] L. No. 1567/L. No. 4048 (Q.B.) 23, reprinted in 26 I.L.M.
1600, 1614 (1987) (implying that the two parties disagreed as to whether they in-
tended New York law or United Kingdom law to govern the contract).
68. Legal Repurcussions of the Freezing of Iranian Assets and Loans, 12 INT'L
CURRENCY REV. 25, 35 (No. 1 1980) [hereinafter Legal Repurcussions]; A. DICEY &
I. MORRIS, supra note 27, at 1290-92.
69. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., [1986] L. No. 1567/L. No.
4048 (Q.B.) 25, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1600, 1612 (1987).
70. Id. at 26.
71. Id.
72. Legal Repurcussions, supra note 68, at 35.
73. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., [1986] L. No. 1567/L. No.
4048 (Q.B.) 19, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1600, 1612 (1987) (stating that the perform-
ance of a contract is excused when it has become illegal under the proper law of the
contract). Because the performance is not illegal under United Kingdom law, Bankers
Trust Company's performance of the contract is not an excuse. Id. at 26.
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ment processing systems in the United States. This method, however, is
illegal under United States law because of the asset freeze. It is a well
established principle of British law that a party to a contract governed
under English law is excused from performance of the contract when
performance "necessarily involves doing an act which is unlawful by
the law of the place where the act has to be done."7' 4 Bankers Trust
Company, in its Eurodollar defense, asserted that the terms of the
managed account arrangement specifically required all transactions in-
volving the LAFB's accounts to pass through its New York office.1
Alternatively, Bankers Trust Company contended that the established
practice of the international Eurodollar market limited the methods of
repayment the LAFB was entitled to demand.76 Bankers Trust Com-
pany argued that complying with the LAFB's demand for repayment of
its London Eurodollar deposits necessitated use of either the Clearing
House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS)" or Fedwire78 mecha-
74. Id. at 19. The House of Lords in Regazzoni v. K.C. Sethia, Ltd. examined
whether performance of a sales contract necessarily involved any illegal action in a
foreign country. Regazzoni v. K.C. Sethia, Ltd., [1957] 3 All E.R. 286. In this case,
Regazzoni, a Swiss resident, agreed to purchase 500,000 jute bags c.i.f. Genoa from
K.C. Sethia, an English company. Id. at 288. Regazzoni informed the English company
of his intention to reexport the jute bags to South Africa. Id. at 293. When the parties
entered the agreement, they knew that they could only obtain the bags from India,
which prohibited the export of any goods destined for South Africa. Id. at 288. The
House of Lords found that as the underlying performance of the sales contract violated
Indian law, its performance necessarily involved illegal action under foreign law. Id. at
288, 292-94. Thus, enforcement of the contract was against English public policy. Id;
cf. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., [19861 L. No. 1567/ L. No. 4048
(Q.B.) 22, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1600, 1614 (1987) (noting that the Libyan bank did
not intend to perform any illegal acts in New York).
75. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., [19861 L. No. 4048 (Q.B.) 9,
reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1600, 1607 (1987). The court, however, found that the LAFB
was entitled to unilaterally alter or terminate the managed account arrangement on 24
hours notice. Id. at 38. The court concluded that the LAFB had, in fact, terminated
the managed account arrangement either implicitly through the telex or April 28, 1986
or expressly through their solicitor on July 30, 1986. Id. at 39. Therefore, on December
23, 1986, the time of the final demand for repayment, the managed account arrange-
ment was not in effect, and the LAFB was not contractually required to conduct its
transaction through Bankers Trust Company New York office. Id.
76. Id. at 40.
77. See infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text (describing the CHIPS dollar
clearing system used to provide repayment of a Eurodollar deposit).
78. See BANKING LAW, supra note 52, § 8.02[7] (describing the Federal Rescrve's
use of Fedwire as a method of an electronic funds transfer). The Fedwire system allows
electronic settlement between member banks. ld; see also id., § 82.0211] - 82.02[5]
(discussing the ways the Federal Reserve operates the Fedwire system). Most Eurodol-
lar transfers, however, take place through the CHIPS system and not Fedwire because
foreign banks, with the exception of central banks, are not members of the Federal
Reserve System and have no access to Fedwire. Carreau, supra note 67, at 162. A
United States member bank may opt to use Fedwire. Id. The CHIPS system, however,
is more frequently used. See N. PENNY & D. BAKER, THE LAW OF ELECTRONiC FUND
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nisms located in the United States.7 9 Because using either system
would necessarily involve conduct in the United States that was illegal
in light of Executive Order No. 12,544, Bankers Trust Company ar-
gued that it was excused from its contractual obligation to honor the
LAFB's demands for repayment of the London account balance.80
Bankers Trust Company's reliance on a defense implied from the prac-
tice of the international Eurodollar market required the court to under-
take an investigation into the operation of the international Eurodollar
market.
3. The History of the Eurodollar
Several factors have contributed to the development of the Eurodol-
lar market. The Soviet Union decided to begin holding dollar deposits
outside of the United States in 1957.81 Some commentators considered
this action the origin of the Eurodollar market."' The Soviet Union de-
posited funds outside the jurisdictional reach of the United States to
limit the ability of the United States to freeze Soviet assets.83 Thus,
investors held their funds in politically secure dollar-denominated ac-
counts in London. 4 Other countries soon followed the Soviet
TRANSFER SYSTEMS § 9.04 (1980) [hereinafter ELECTRONIC TRANSFER SYSTEMS] (not-
ing that CHIPS handles more than 90% of interbank transfers of United States dollars
on any given day).
79. See infra notes 101-49 and accompanying text (discussing the operations of the
Eurodollar markets and the potential effects of those operations on the LAFB's de-
mands for repayment of their London Eurodollar deposits).
80. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., [1986] L. No. 1567/L. No.
4048 (Q.B.) 40-42, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1600, 1623-24 (1987).
81. S. KHOURY, DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING 24 (1980).
82. Id.; Korth, International Financial Markets in THE INTERNATIONAL BANKING
HANDBOOK I 1 (W. Baughn & D. Mandich ed. 1983). Contra R. JOHNSTON, THE Eco-
NOMICS OF THE EURO-MARKET 10 (1982) (questioning the view that overseas deposits
of the Soviet Union were the leading impetus behind the growth of the billion dollar
Eurodollar market). Another factor contributing to the creation of the Eurodollar mar-
ket in the 1950s involved the British prohibition on the use of sterling for financing
international trade transactions between nonsterling area countries. R. MCKINNON,
MONEY IN INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE 201-02 (1979). Consequently, the dollar re-
placed the British pound as the vehicle currency of international trade, leading to a
dramatic increase in financing arrangements denominated in dollars. R. JOHNSTON,
supra, at 10. The International Monetary Fund prompted the growth of the Eurodollar
market in establishing the dollar as the vehicle currency for financing third-party trade
and as a reserve currency in 1945. S. KHOURY, supra note 81, at 25.
83. P. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL BANKING 294 (1983). The Soviet Union
transferred its funds from the United States to the Moscow Narodny Bank in London
and the Banque Commerciale pour L'Europe du Nord in Paris. D. KANE, THE
EURODOLLAR MARKET AND THE YEARS OF CRISIS 1 (1983).
84. N. DEAK & J. CELUSAK, INTERNATIONAL BANKING 167 (1984). Eurodollars
are generally free from any government controls. Korth, supra note 82, at 9; S. KIM &




A second factor stimulating the development of the Eurodollar mar-
ket involved the effects of Regulation Q88 on United States and foreign
investors. Regulation Q placed restrictions on the amount of interest
United States banks could pay on domestic deposits.8 United States
investors, seeking a high profit yield on their money, opened Eurodollar
accounts during the tight money years of 1968 and 1969.88 Regulation
Q only applied to banks located in the United States, and European
banks could, therefore, offer higher interest rates for deposits and at-
tract dollar deposits at the expense of United States banks. 9 Thus, in-
vestors placed an increased amount of their dollars into Eurodollar
accounts.
A third factor facilitating the growth of the Eurodollar market in-
volved United States programs in the 1960s designed to reduce the
American balance of payments deficit."0 In 1963, President Kennedy
sponsored the Interest Equalization Tax Act.9' This Act taxed the yield
on foreign securities, discouraging United States citizens from purchas-
ing foreign investments.92 In 1965, the United States government im-
19 (1983).
85. See D. KANE, supra note 83, at 2 (referring to the expansion of Eurodollar
accounts in the London financial market in the late 1950s following the Soviet deposits
of funds into that market); M. STIGUM, supra note 30, at 105 (noting that other Com-
munist countries in addition to the Soviet Union began to place funds in the Eurodollar
market in the late 1950s).
86. 12 C.F.R. § 217 (1982).
87. Id.; Effros, The Whys and Wherefores of Eurodollars, 23 Bus. LAw. 629, 637-
38 (1968) (discussing the limitations that Regulation Q places on payment of interest
on sight deposits and time deposits); D. KANE, supra note 83, at 2 (noting that Regula-
tion Q also restricts the payment of interest on demand deposits).
88. M. STIGUM, supra note 30, at 106; see R. JOHNSTON, supra note 82, at 14-15
(noting that Regulation Q restricted the yields on deposits placed with United States
banks).
89. D. KANE, supra note 83, at 2.
90. M. STIGUM, supra note 30, at 106. Several monetary scholars assert that the
consistent United States balance of payments deficits were an important stimulus be-
hind the development of the Eurodollar market. G. YossY, INTERNATIONAL MONEY
FLOWS AND CURRENCY CRISIS 75-76 (1984); S. KHOURY, supra note 81, at 26; D.
KANE, supra note 83, at 142. The central contention of these monetary analysts is that
as the United States spent more money abroad than it earned, the deficit funneled
dollars from the United States to Europe. G. Yossy, supra, at 75. European banks,
able to offer higher interest rates than United States banks, became a natural recepta-
cle for the large dollar balances accumulated overseas. P. EINZIG & B. QUINN, THE
EURODOLLAR SYSTEM 19 (1977). Contra A. CROCKETT, INTERNATIONAL MONEY 179
(1979) (refuting the assessment that the United States balance of payments deficit
facilitated the rapid expansion of the Eurodollar market).
91. Interest Equalization Tax Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-563, 78 Stat. 809
(1964) (retroactive to July 19, 1963) (repealed 1974).
92. S. KHOURY, supra note 81, at 25; R. MCKINNON, supra note 82, at 203. A
consequence of the Interest Equalization Tax Act was the increased demand for me-
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posed the Voluntary Foreign Credit Restraint Program on United
States commercial banks." This Program prohibited United States
banks and other financial institutions from making loans to foreigners
on a short-term basis.94 The foreign direct investment regulations re-
placed the Voluntary Foreign Credit Restraint Program in 1968.0 The
foreign direct investment regulations permitted United States multina-
tional corporations involved in direct investment to finance a foreign
investment outside the United States.9 Therefore, United States banks,
opening overseas branches to service their multinational clients, spurred
the growth of the Eurodollar market.
9 7
A final stimulus behind the development of the Eurodollar market
involved an increase in the surplus reserves of the Organization of Pe-
troleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).9 8 When oil prices rose in the
1970s, OPEC members funneled their excess cash reserves into the
Eurocurrency market. 9 The OPEC members, therefore, placed a large
surplus of dollars in Eurodollar accounts. 00
4. The Nature of Eurodollars
The LAFB, in its original motion for summary judgment, asserted
that the London account was not a Eurodollar account and that it was
therefore inappropriate to imply a term from the practices of the inter-
national Eurodollar market.' Bankers Trust Company, however,
dium- and long-term finance in the Eurodollar capital markets. R. JOHNSTON, supra
note 82, at 13-14; G. Yossy, supra note 90, at 77-78.
93. M. STIGUM, supra note 30, at 107.
94. R. McKINNON, supra note 82, at 203; M. STIGUM, supra note 30, at 107.
95. 15 C.F.R. §§ 1000-1050 (1974), issued pursuant to Exec. Order No. 11,387, 33
Fed. Reg. 47 (1968), revoked 40 Fed. Reg. 30,481 (1974).
96. S. KHOURY, supra note 81, at 25.
97. S. KIM & S. MILLER, supra note 84, at 20. The foreign branches of United
States banks also realized their potential to service foreign companies in the local bank-
ing market seeking financial and corporate business information for purposes of trans-
acting business in the United States. Id.
98. N. DEAK & J. CELUSAK, supra note 84, at 167-68.
99. M. STIGUM, supra note 30, at 107; N. DEAK & J. CELUSAK, supra note 84, at
167-68. At one point, the OPEC nations were the largest single source of funds for the
entire Eurocurrency market. Id.
100. N. DEAK & J. CELUSAK, supra note 84, at 168; see Crane & Hayes, The
International Role of U.S. Banks in Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL BANKING 463 (E.
Roussakis ed. 1983) (stating that at the end of 1980, oil exporting countries held ap-
proximately $335 billion in Eurodollar accounts). Of this sum, approximately $105 bil-
lion belonged to six oil exporting countries: Libya, Iraq, Iran, Oman, Trinidad and
Tobago, and Brunei. Id. at 465.
101. Financial Times, Dec. 4, 1986, at 6, col. 3; see F. MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECTS
OF MONEY 195 (4th ed. 1982)(remarking that a depositor can hold a dollar-denomi-
nated account outside the United States that is not characterized as a Eurodollar ac-
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noted that a call account payable on demand, involving multiples of $1
million, was a contract within the scope of the Eurodollar market. 02
Thus, the English court had to determine whether the London account
was a Eurodollar account. °3 Answering this question required an ex-
amination of the nature of Eurodollar accounts, the manner in which
the LAFB used the London account, and the methods Bankers Trust
Company used to manage the account.
Determining the exact nature of a Eurodollar account requires a re-
view of the definition of a Eurodollar and its characteristics. The com-
monly accepted definition of a Eurodollar is a dollar-denominated bank
deposit located outside the United States."' Most commentators assert
that Eurodollars are usually held in nonnegotiable, fixed-term time de-
posits10 5 or in negotiable, Eurodollar certificates of deposit.100 Scholars
analyzing the nature of Eurodollar accounts argue, however, that call
accounts payable on demand are also properly included within the
scope of the Eurodollar market.1 07 Justice Evans, granting a summary
count). Distinguishing between an ordinary dollar-denominated deposit and a Eurodol-
lar deposit requires consideration of how the depositor uses the account and how the
bank manages the account. Id.
102. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., [1986] L. No. 1567 (C.A.)
14.
103. See id. at 9 (noting that in the lower court, Justice Evans held in his summary
judgment motion that the London account was not a Eurodollar account). Justice Ev-
ans relied on the affidavits of two monetary experts to characterize the London ac-
count. Id. at 14-15. These affidavits argued that the exceedingly long maturity of the
London account and the Bankers Trust Company practice of providing account state-
ments to the LAFB indicated that the London account was an ordinary dollar deposit
account rather than a Eurodollar account. Id. at 15-17. Accordingly, Justice Evans of
the High Court of Justice, granted the LAFB's motion for summary judgment. On
appeal, however, Justice Kerr of the Court of Appeal, noting that such considerations
were inappropriate in the context of a summary judgment motion, reversed Justice Ev-
ans's ruling. Id. at 17.
104. L. WEERAMANTRY & W. SCHLICHTING, supra note 37, § 211.05; Korth, The
Eurocurrency Markets, in THE INTERNATIONAL BANKING HANDBOOK 17 (W. Baughn
& D. Mandich eds. 1983) [hereinafter Eurocurrency Markets].
105. See L. WEERAMANTRY & W. SCHLICHTING, supra note 37, § 9.07 (explaining
that a time deposit is a deposit for a certain period of time, where the depositor gener-
ally does not have a right to withdraw a deposit for a period of 14 days or more after
the date of the deposit).
106. See Roussakis, Glossary of Financial Ternis in INTERNATIONAL BANKING 517
(E. Roussakis ed. 1983) (defining the negotiable certificate of deposit as a large denom-
ination certificate of deposit that can be sold but cannot be cashed in before maturity).
From the point of view of investors, Eurodollar time deposits having fixed maturities
also have the disadvantage of illiquidity. M. STIGUM, supra note 30, at 115. Citibank,
however, was the first bank to provide liquidity to Eurodollar certificates by issuing
Eurodollar certificates of deposit in London. Id. Other United States banks and foreign
banks with London branches soon followed Citibank's lead. Id.
107. M. STIGUM, supra note 30, at 113; F. LEES, INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND
FINANCE 293 (1974); see Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co. [1986] L.
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judgment for LAFB effectively rejected attempts to expand the scope
of the Eurodollar market to include call accounts payable on de-
mand.10 8 At a full trial, Justice Staughton ruled instead that a call ac-
count fell within the scope of the Eurodollar market.'
A further consideration of the additional characteristics of Eurodol-
lar accounts is necessary to determine whether it is possible to properly
classify the LAFB's London account as a Eurodollar account. Eurodol-
lar accounts typically have three common attributes. First, Eurodollar
deposits are generally interest-bearing accounts in an amount exceed-
ing $1 million. 110 Second, unlike an ordinary dollar deposit, a depositor
does not make payments into or withdrawals from a Eurodollar account
through the use of a check."' Third, most scholars agree that commer-
cial banks are often the owners of Eurodollar deposits." 2
Examining the available facts, the British court, at a full trial, con-
cluded that the London account was a Eurodollar account." 3 First, the
LAFB maintained the London account balance at approximately $200
million.'" Second, the account was an interest-bearing account during
all relevant times pertaining to the Libyan litigation." 5 Third, the
No. 1567 (C.A.) 16 (examining the affidavits of two monetary analysts who included
call accounts within the scope of the Eurodollar market). Contra Eurocurrency Mar-
kets, supra note 104, at 16; P. OPPENHEIM, supra note 83, at 297 (stating that only
time deposits are considered as Eurodollar deposits). One commentator has suggested
that many banks retain call accounts because call money is cheap, the investor can
withdraw on one day's notice, and it is a stable source of funds. M. STIGUM, supra note
30, at 113.
108. See Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co. [1986] L. No. 1567
(C.A.) 7, 9 (stating that the London account was at all relevant times a call account,
payable on demand and, thus, not properly within the scope of the Eurodollar market).
109. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., [1986] L. No. 1567/ L. No.
4048 (Q.B.) I, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1600, 1603-04 (1987).
110. A. CROCKETT, supra note 90, at 169 (maintaining that the usual Eurodollar
deposit is $1 million); J. LITTLE, EURODOLLARS-THE MONEY-MARKET GYPSIEs 22
(1975) (remarking that the average Eurodollar deposit ranges from $1 million to $5
million).
IlI. B. KETTELL, THE FINANCE OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 219 (1981); F.
MANN, supra note 101, at 195.
112. See J. LITTLE, supra note 110, at 23 (commenting that commercial banks own
80% of the Eurodollar deposits in London, the largest Eurodollar market); B. KET-
TELL, supra note 111, at 218 (stating that the Eurodollar market is principally an
interbank market). Other depositors in the Eurrocurrency market include central
banks, government bodies, large corporations and affluent individuals. M. STIGUM,
supra note 30, at 113.
113. See Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., [1986] L. No. 1567/L.
No. 4048 (Q.B.) 40-42, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1600, 1623-24 (1987) (assuming the
Eurodollar nature of the LAFB's London account).





LAFB never effected any payments into or withdrawals from its
London account using checks.116 Bankers Trust Company, therefore,
had little difficulty in establishing that at all relevant times, the
LAFB's London account was a Eurodollar account.
Having decided that the LAFB's London account was within the
scope of the international Eurodollar market, the British court next ex-
amined the customs and usages in the operation of the Eurodollar mar-
ket governing the repayment obligations of Eurobanks."17 When funds
are held in a Eurodollar account, repayment will generally occur only
within the monetary system of the country issuing the currency, that is,
the United States." 8 To receive payment from a Eurodollar account,
the LAFB must instruct Bankers Trust Company in London to make
payments to a specific account in its correspondent bank in the United
States." 9 In turn, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Transfers (SWIFT) 120 will instruct Bankers Trust Company in New
York to move funds from its correspondent account held for its foreign
branch to the Libyan nominated correspondent bank account in the
United States.' 2' The actual transfer of funds is effected through the
United States domestic clearing system for international payments,
CHIPS, located in New York. 22 Consequently, the transfer is effected
116. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., [1986] L. No. 1567/ L. No.
4048 (Q.B.) 1, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1600, 1600 (1987).
117. Id. at 40-44.
118. Carreau, supra note 67, at 161; see Mann, Zahlungsprobleme bei
Fremdwahrungsschulden (Payment Problems in Connection with Foreign Currency
Debts), 36 ANNUAIRE SUISSE DE DROIT INT'L 93, 98-99 [hereinafter Payment
Problems] (remarking that the place of repayment of a Eurodollar contract is in New
York).
119. Hoffman & Giddy, supra note 7, at 78.
120. See ELECTRONIC TRANSFER SYSTEMS, supra note 78, §§ 9.01, 9.05 (noting
that SWIFT serves exclusively as a telecommunication network facilitating multicur-
rency payments messages between participating banks). SWIFT does not participate in
the settlements of various bank transactions. Id. SWIFT is a privately owned coopera-
tive society in Belgium. Id.
121. Hoffman & Giddy, supra note 7, at 78.
122. Id. CHIPS is an automated facility processing more than 90% of interbank
transfers of dollars daily. ELECTRONIC TRANSFER SYSTEMS, supra note 78, § 9.04. As
of December 1984, there were 133 CHIPS participants. D. BAKER & R. BRANDEL,
THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFER SYSTEMS § 9.04 (Supp. 1985). Twenty-one
of these participants were designated as clearing or settlement banks for Eurodollar
deposits. Id. To participate in CHIPS, nonclearing members must enter an agreement
with a settling member bank. Id; see Roussakis, Evolution of International Banking
and its U.S. Development, in INTERNATIONAL BANKING 34-36 (E. Roussakis ed. 1983)
[hereinafter Evolution of International Banking] (tracing the evolution of CHIPS as
the premier settlement mechanism for Eurodollar transactions); Delbruk & Co. v.
Manufactures Hanover Trust Co., 464 F. Supp. 989, 992-93 (S.D.N.Y.), arfd, 609
F.2d 1047 (2d Cir. 1979) (describing the operation of CHIPS that allows correspon-
dent banks to offset inpayments and outpayments among themselves).
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on the same business day the instruction is sent,123 and settlement is
made between the banks in federal funds. 124 At the end of each busi-
ness day, the Federal Reserve Bank will adjust the Libyan and New
York Bankers Trust Company reserve accounts. 125 Therefore, because
Eurodollar transactions are ultimately cleared through the CHIPS
mechanism in the United States, the repayment of Eurodollar deposits
requires that some transactions occur in the United States.121
If Bankers Trust Company is to honor the LAFB's demand for re-
payment of the London Eurodollar account, it must use the CHIPS
mechanism located in the United States. 27 Using the CHIPS mecha-
nism would require actions in violation of the Libyan Sanctions Regu-
lations. 28 Under the laws of the United Kingdom, however, a party is
properly excused from performing a contractual obligation if the per-
formance involves actions in a forum where the actions are illegal.
In Ralli Brothers v. Compania Naviera Sota y Aznar,129 the English
court examined the illegality defense and declined to order the defend-
ant to perform an act in a foreign state that violated the laws of that
state.' 30 A charter agreement between the defendant, an English firm,
123. Evolution of International Banking, supra note 122, at 34. A central CHIPS
computer managing the transfer of funds will debit a specified amount from the corre-
spondent bank account of the London-Bankers Trust and will credit the nominated
Libyan correspondent bank account with that equivalent amount. R. GOODE, PAYMENT
OBLIGATIONS IN COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL TRANSFERS 101 (1983) [hereinafter
PAYMENT OBLIGATIONS]; M. STIGUM, supra note 30, at 434-35.
124. Evolution of International Banking, supra note 122, at 34. Federal funds are
deposit balances of financial institutions held with Federal Reserve banks. Id.
125. PAYMENT OBLIGATIONS, supra note 123, at 97. The Federal Reserve Bank
maintains an escrow account to accumulate and disburse settlement payments. D.
BAKER & R. BRANDEL, supra note 122, § 9.04. Using a CHIPS report calculating in
payments and outpayments between settling banks, the member banks use CHIPS to
settle accounts with each other at the end of the business day via transfers through the
Federal Reserve account using Fedwire. Id.
126. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., [1986] L. No. 1567/L. No.
4048 (Q.B.) 41-42, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1600, 1623-24 (1987). During the trial,
Bankers Trust Company presented expert testimony noting that all participants in the
Eurodollar market recognized the market as strictly a noncash market and that all
Eurodollar transactions, except those involving a movement of funds from one account
at a given bank to another account at that same bank, are cleared in the United States.
Id. at 42.
127. See id. (explaining that with one minor exception, all Eurodollar transactions
are cleared in the United States). The one minor exception, known as an in-house
transfer, would require the London branch of Bankers Trust Company to transfer the
balance of the LAFB's account to a beneficiary the LAFB nominated, who also has an
account with the London branch. Id. at 32. The LAFB, however, did not want to bene-
fit any other institution with an account at the London branch. Id. at 46.
128. Financial Times, Dec. 3, 1986, at 9, col. 1.
129. Ralli Brothers v. Compania Naviera Sota y Aznar, [1920] 2 K.B. 287.
130. Id. at 292. A British court recently examined the illegality defense. XAG
Bank v. A. Bank, 2 All E.R. 464, 467 (1983). In XAG Bank, the United States District
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and the plaintiff, a Spanish company, for a voyage from Calcutta to
Barcelona contemplated payment for freight in the amount of fifty
pounds at the port of destination.131 When the vessel arrived in Barce-
lona, the parties discovered that a Spanish decree made it illegal for
shippers or carriers to pay or receive more than 875 pesetas per ton of
freight.1 32 The English charterers, therefore, refused to pay any amount
in excess of 875 pesetas to the Spanish shipowners, a fraction of the
fifty pounds due under the original agreement. 133
The English court, exhibiting a marked deference to Spanish law,
held that the English shipper did not have to pay the Spanish owners
any amount in excess of the 875 pesetas per ton of freight allowed
under Spanish law.1 34 The court accepted the principle that "a contract
is invalid if its performance becomes unlawful under the law of the
country where performance is required." 1 3  Thus, no civilized state
Court for the Southern District of New York served a subpeona on A bank, a foreign
branch of a United States bank, requiring production of books, records, and other doc-
uments relating to the accounts of X, A, and G. Id. The subpeona noted that the court
would subject the bank to contempt of court and penalties if it did not comply with the
subpeona. Id. at 470. Subsequently, the plaintiffs sought an injunction to prohibit de-
fendants from producing documents relating to their accounts. Id. at 467. Defendants
argued that a British court's injunction would require it to perform an unlawful act
violating New York law. Id. at 470.
The British court granted an injunction, holding that the bank owed a duty of confi-
dentiality to plaintiffs prohibiting production of documents relating to the accounts of
X, A, and G. Id. at 480. The British court took the position that unless a United States
legislative decree or judgment ordered disclosure of these documents, the bank would
not violate United States law in maintaining secrecy. Id. at 465. Moreover, if the bank
presented a sufficient excuse to the United States District Court for not producing the
documents, the court would excuse it from releasing the documents. Id. Thus, the En-
glish court held that the United States should refrain from imposing the sanction of
contempt on the A bank complying with its duty of confidentiality owed to XAG. Id.
Under this analysis, the British court should recognize Libyan sanctions regulations
prohibiting repayment of the Eurodollar account. The United States regulations impose
penalties on United States persons if they permit any withdrawal of dollar-denominated
deposits unless a license has been obtained. 31 C.F.R. §§ 550.209, 550.701 (1987).
Because the United States must clear the Bankers Trust Company's repayment of the
LAFB's Eurodollar account, the British court's failure to excuse its performance will
result in the Bankers Trust Company violating the Libyan Sanctions Regulations. Lib-
yan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., [1986] L. No. 1567/L. No. 4048 (Q.B.)
3, 40, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1600, 1604, 1623 (1987).
131. Ralli Brothers v. Compania Naviera Sota y Aznar, [1920] 2 K.B. 287, 288-
90.
132. Id. at 290.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 292.
135. Id. at 291. One can interpret Ralli Brothers v. Compania Naviera Sota Y
Aznar as accepting certain maxims on the meaning of impossibility of performance.
The first and most widely accepted maxim is that impossibility of performance depends
on the law where the contract is performed. Payment Problems, supra note 118, at
104. Second, another formulation of the decision in Ralli Brothers is that the statute of
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should force a debtor to make a payment that is a punishable offense at
the place of payment.1 36 Consequently, the English court released the
English debtor from repaying the excess amount due under the
contract.1
3 7
The decision in Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co."3 8
does not retreat from this well accepted legal principle. Bankers Trust
Company argued that the practice of the international Eurodollar mar-
ket gave rise to an implied term requiring repayment of the LAFB's
Eurodollar account through the CHIPS mechanism located in the
United States.' 39 Repayment in this manner would require Bankers
Trust Company to violate the Libyan Sanctions Regulations. 4 Bank-
ers Trust Company, therefore, argued that the principles derived from
the Ralli Brothers case should excuse its refusal to honor the LAFB's
demands for repayment.' 4 '
Both the LAFB and Bankers Trust Company presented expert testi-
mony concerning the established practices of the international Eurodol-
lar market.' The court, after weighing the evidence, concluded that
the LAFB had presented the more compelling evidence. 143 The court
debt determines whether or not impossibility under the law of the place of performance
exists. Id. Finally, the decision in Ralli Brothers may mean that a debtor is discharged
from performing under the contract if the law of the place of performance deems such
performance an impossibility. Id.
136. Payment Problems, supra note 118, at 104.
137. Ralli Brothers v. Compania Naviera Sota y Aznar, [1920] 2 K.B. 287, 292;
see Payment Problems, supra note 118, at 105 (noting that the consequences of releas-
ing a debtor from payment of a monetary obligation is legally unacceptable). One mon-
etary analyst has noted that the performance of a money debt is never impossible. F.
MANN, supra note 101, at 421. The debtor and the creditor may reach an agreement
changing the place of repayment of a money debt, thereby circumventing exchange
restrictions. Id. Moreover, the creditor could also refrain from demanding immediate
payment of a money debt. Id. If a Eurodollar contract has expressly or impliedly speci-
fied that repayment of a Eurodollar deposit must proceed through CHIPS, then the
parties should always anticipate that repayment may become impossible under this sys-
tem. Id. at 420. According to one monetary scholar, if payment should become tempo-
rarily suspended under the CHIPS system, then the obligation of the English bank is
only temporarily suspended. Id.
138. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., [1986] L. No. 1567/L. No.
4048 (Q.B.), reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1600 (1987).
139. Id. at 40.
140. Id. at 3.
141. See id. at 19 (stating that the performance of contractual obligations is ex-
cused when performance necessarily requires doing an act that is unlawful under the
laws of the place where it must be done).
142. Id. at 41.
143. Id. at 42. Additionally, the course of dealings between the parties from De-
cember 1980 to January 1986 was contrary to an implied term requiring clearing all
transactions through the CHIPS mechanism in the United States. Id. at 43. Even
though a large percentage of the LAFB's transactions involving the London account
were cleared through the CHIPS mechanism, that mechanism was not exclusive. Id.
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declined to imply a term into the deposit contract making use of the
CHIPS mechanism the exclusive means through which Bankers Trust
Company could meet the LAFB's repayment demands. 44 Having re-
jected Bankers Trust Company's Eurodollar defense, the court consid-
ered the additional mechanisms Bankers Trust Company could use to
comply with the LAFB's demand for repayment, 145 and considered
whether these mechanisms would require some actions in the United
States in violation of the Libyan Sanctions Regulations.'4 The court
ultimately concluded that Bankers Trust Company could honor the
LAFB's demands for repayment through the delivery of an appropriate
sum of United States dollars to the LAFB in London.14 This method
of repayment, the court reasoned, would not involve any illegal actions
in the United States. 48 The court, therefore, found that because honor-
ing the LAFB's demands for repayment of the London Eurodollar ac-
count was not illegal under the proper substantive law governing the
deposit contract and did not require actions in a forum where such ac-
tions are illegal, Bankers Trust Company was liable.
49
II. THE BRETTON WOODS DEFENSE
The previous section analyzed the customs and practices of the inter-
national Eurodollar market and whether those practices gave rise to an
implied contractual term that would effectively defeat the LAFB's de-
mand for repayment of its London Eurodollar account. Rather than
concentrate on the specific facts of the Libyan litigation, Part II out-
lines a public international law defense available to commercial banks
defending against depositors seeking repayment of frozen Eurodollar
144. id.
145. See id. at 32-37 (listing the various methods Bankers Trust Company could
use to honor the LAFB's demand for repayment).
146. See id. at 46-55 (examining whether each of the various forms of repayment
Bankers Trust Company can use would even remotely raise the possibility of involving
the mechanisms of the United States commercial banking system).
147. Id. at 51. Alternatively, if United States dollars are unavailable, the LAFB is
entitled to demand payment in sterling. Id. at 54. Generally, banks participating in the
Eurodollar market do not settle transactions in cash. PAYIENT OBUGATIONS, supra
note 123, at 91; Effros, supra note 87, at 642. Where a depositor is withdrawing a
large amount of money, as the LAFB was, payment in cash is both risky and cumber-
some. PAYMENT OBLIGATIONS, supra note 123, at 91. The court, after recognizing the
commercial impracticalities of a cash payment, chose to ignore the factors rendering a
cash payment extremely troublesome. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co.,
[1986] L. No. 1567/L. No. 4048 (Q.B.) 50-51, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1600, 1628
(1987).
148. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., [19861 L. No. 1567/ L. No.
4048 (Q.B.) 51, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1600, 1628 (1987).
149. Id.
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accounts. This section examines the analytic structure of article VIII,
section 2(b) of the Articles of Agreement of the International Mone-
tary Fund, reviews the various interpretations of article VIII, section
2(b) followed in the United States and Europe, and concludes that in
jurisdictions adhering to a broad interpretation of article VIII, section
2(b), the IMF defense is a viable alternative available to commercial
banks defending against depositors seeking repayment of frozen
Eurodollar accounts.
A. THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
The IMF is a specialized agency of the United Nations that func-
tions as an independent international organization regulating countries
in matters affecting their currencies or balance of payments. 10 Appli-
cable regulations and statements setting forth the general purposes of
the IMF are contained in the Articles of Agreement of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund which were formally adopted at the Bretton
Woods Conference in 1944.1'1 Article 1152 of the Articles of Agreement
lists purposes relative to article VIII, section 2(b), including duties to
eliminate foreign exchange restrictions hampering world trade, duties
to maintain orderly exchange arrangements among members, and du-
ties to promote international monetary cooperation through a perma-
nent institution permitting consultation or collaboration on interna-
tional monetary conflicts.'53 Many courts set forth these stated
purposes of the IMF in their decisions to support either a narrow or a
broad interpretation of article VIII, section 2(b).1 14
150. Gold, The International Monetary Fund, in A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO INTERNA-
TIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 7, 8 (W. Surrey & D. Wallace Jr. 2d ed. 1979) [here-
inafter The IMF]; see J. HORSEFIELD, INTRODUCTION TO THE FUND 4-18 (IMF Pam-
phlet Series No. 1, 2d ed. 1965) (providing representative examples of the IMF
supervising par value, convertibility, and stand-by and quota arrangements among its
members).
151. The IMF, supra note 150, at 9.
152. Agreement, supra note 24, art. I.
153. Id. Other purposes of the IMF mentioned in article I include: duties to facili-
tate the expansion of international trade, duties to make the general resources of the
IMF temporarily available to its members so they can correct maladjustments in their
balance of payments without reliance on measures destructive of national or interna-
tional prosperity, and duties to assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of
payments in respect of current transactions between members. Id.
154. See Wilson, Smithett & Cope Ltd. v. Terruzzi, [1976] 1 Q.B. 683, 709 (C.A.)
(noting one purpose of the IMF, the promotion of international trade, supports a nar-
row interpretation of article VIII, section 2(b)); see also Lessinger v. Mirau, 22 I.L.R.
725, 726 (Oberlandesgericht, Schleswig-Holstein 1954) (implying that another purpose
of the Fund, promoting cooperation of members with respect to exchange control regu-




1. Structure of the Membership
The IMF is composed of both original members, those countries rep-
resented at the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference
whose governments accepted membership before December 31, 1945,
and countries accepting membership after 194 5 .115 Resolutions of the
IMF Board of Governors establish the terms and conditions of mem-
bership for these countries.""8 One requirement of membership is that
member countries respect the Articles of Agreement and undertake
general obligations under articles IV 57 and VII118 of the Articles of
Agreement.159 The IMF may publicly sanction any member that fails
to observe the obligations imposed under these articles. 6 0 The IMF
may also sanction a member in an informal manner. 10' Consequently,
most member countries observe their obligations, recognizing that pen-
alties and public sanctions may adversely affect their positions in the
IMF and among various countries individually.
6 2
An additional general obligation of all members is found in article
VIII, section 2(b). 163 Article VIII, section 2(b) imposes restrictions on
all exchange contracts involving IMF members.' 6 The article states, in
155. Agreement, supra note 24, art. II.
156. The IMF, supra note 150, at 9; see Gold, Australia and Article Vi1I, Section
2(b) of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, 57 AusTL. Li.
560, 561 (1983) (discussing the requirements imposed on countries applying for mem-
bership in the IMF).
157. Agreement, supra note 24, art. IV. Article IV requires members to collaborate
with the IMF and other members to assure orderly exchange arrangements and pro-
mote a stable system of exchange rates. Id.
158. Agreement, supra note 24, art. VIII. Under article VIII, section 3, members
have a general obligation to avoid discriminatory currency arrangements or multiple
currency practices. Id.
159. Agreement, supra note 24, arts. IV, VIII.
160. See J. GOLD, LEGAL INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONE-
TARY SYSTEM 153-54 (J. Everson & J. Oh 2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter LEGAL AND INSTI-
TUTIONAL ASPECTS] (noting that the IMF, upon a special two-thirds majority vote,
may publish a report made to a member who violates article XII, section 8).
161. See Agreement, supra note 24, art. XII (discussing the right of the fund to
communicate its views informally to a member on any matter arising under the Arti-
cles of Agreement); see also Gold, Certain Aspects of the Law and Practice of the
International Monetary Fund, in THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS
71 (S. Schwebel ed. 1971) (describing the process of communicating the views of the
IMF Managing Director and his or her staff to breaching members under an informal
arrangement).
162. LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS, supra note 160, at 178.
163. Agreement, supra note 24, art. VIII. Members are also expected to cooperate
in making the exchange control regulations of other members more effective if such
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pertinent part: "[E]xchange contracts which involve the currency of
any member and which are contrary to the exchange control regula-
tions of that member maintained or imposed consistently with this
Agreement shall be unenforceable in the territories of any member." 1 5
Defining a Eurodollar deposit arrangement as an exchange contract in-
volving United States dollars allows United States banks defending
against claims for repayment of frozen Eurodollar accounts to argue
that repayment is contrary to a United States asset freeze, which is an
exchange control regulation imposed consistently with the IMF Agree-
ment. 6' Applying article VIII, section 2(b), a United States bank must
prove four elements: 1) that the Eurodollar arrangement constitutes an
exchange contract; 2) that the Eurodollar arrangement involves United
States currency; 3) that the Eurodollar arrangement contradicts a
United States exchange control regulation, an asset freeze in this case;
and 4) that the exchange control regulation is consistent with the IMF
Agreement. If the defending commercial bank proves all four elements
of the IMF defense, courts in all IMF member states, including the
United Kingdom, must honor a United States asset freeze and refrain
from ordering the performance of a Eurodollar contract.167
a. Eurodollar Arrangements as Exchange Contracts
The IMF has never precisely defined an exchange contract, but vari-
ous courts of member countries have interpreted the term. 68 These
courts have developed both a narrow and a broad interpretation of ex-
change contracts under article VIII, section 2(b). The narrow or literal
interpretation states that an exchange contract has as its immediate
purpose the exchange of one currency for another.'69 The broad inter-
165. Id.
166. See Bank Markazi Iran v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. [1979] L. No.
5907 (Q.B.) 6 (raising the IMF argument during the Iranian litigation in London).
167. Edwards, supra note 9, at 881; see SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 27, at
251 (stating that if the requirements of article VIII, section 2(b) are fulfilled, judicial
authorities of member countries should not assist other members through awarding
damages for the nonperformance of exchange contracts).
168. See Baker, Enforcement of Contracts Violating Foreign Exchange Control
Laws, 3 INT'L TRADE L.J. 247, 253 (1977) (analyzing how the courts of several Euro-
pean nations and the United States have interpreted article VIII, section 2(b)).
169. Nussbaum, Exchange Control and the International Monetary Fund, 59
YALE L.J. 395, 426 (1950) (stating the narrow interpretation of an exchange contract
for the first time); see Frantzmann v. Ponijen, 30 I.L.R. 423, 423 (Neth., D. Ct. Maas-
tricht 1966) (applying the literal interpretation of an exchange contract and holding a
loan contract unenforceable under article VIII, section 2(b)). In Frantzmann v.
Ponijen, the plaintiff and defendant, both residents of Indonesia, entered into a loan
agreement requiring the plaintiff to pay the defendant in Indonesian rupiahs. Id. In
return, the defendant agreed to repay the plaintiff Dutch guilders in Holland. Id. When
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pretation defines an exchange contract as a contract that affects the
exchange resources of the member country imposing the restrictions." 0
Consequently, it is substantially more difficult to categorize a Eurodol-
lar arrangement as an exchange contract under the narrow definition
than it is under the broader definition.
The United States171 and the United Kingdom,172 in adopting the
narrow definition of an exchange contract, have focused on the specific
object of the contractual agreement. In Wilson Smnithett & Cope Ltd.
v. Terruzzi,7 3 the English Court of Appeal definitively stated that an
exchange contract is a contract to exchange the currency of one coun-
try for the currency of another.17 4 In Terruzzi, the plaintiff, a dealer on
the London metal exchange, extended credit to Terruzzi, an Italian res-
the defendant made only partial repayment on the loan, the plaintiff sued for the bal-
ance. Id. The District Court, applying a literal interpretation of an exchange contract,
held that the loan contract was an exchange contract calling for an exchange of rupiahs
for guilders. Id. See generally Williams, Extraterritorial Enforcement of Exchange
Control Regulations Under the International Monetary Fund Agreement, 15 VA. J.
INT'L L. 319, 337 (1975) [hereinafter Extraterritorial Enforcement] (noting that one
legal scholar, abandoning the literal interpretation, believes that an exchange contract
exists only where a party promises to pay money in the currency of the country impos-
ing the restrictions).
170. J. GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT IN THE COURTS II 393 (1983) [hereinafter
COURTS II]; see Mann, The Private International Law of Exchange Control Under the
International Monetary Fund Agreement, 2 INT'L & CoiMp. L.Q. 97, 102 (1953) (ad-
vocating that a broad interpretation of an exchange contract facilitates and supports
the economic purposes of the IMF).
171. See Banco do Brasil, S.A. v. A.C. Israel Commodity Co., 12 N.Y.2d 371,375-
76, 190 N.E.2d 235, 236-37, 239 N.Y.S.2d 872, 873-74 (1963), cert. denied, 376 US.
906 (1964) (following the narrow interpretation of an exchange contract and ignoring
the economic goals of the IMF); see also Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa
Rica, 570 F. Supp. 870, 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that a loan contract requiring
repayment in United States dollars, the currency of the loan, is not an exchange con-
tract). But see Banco Frances e Brasileiro S.A., v. Doe, 36 N.Y.2d 592, 598, 331
N.E.2d 502, 506, 370 N.Y.S.2d 534, 539 (1975) (applying the broad definition of an
exchange contract and enforcing currency controls of a friendly nation). At times, how-
ever, United States courts have failed to give any meaningful definition of an exchange
contract. Williams, Foreign Exchange Control Regulation and the New York Court of
Appeal: J. Zeevi & Sons Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda) Ltd., 9 CORNELL INT'L LJ.
239, 243 (1976). Even though the contract in question, labeled as a letter of credit, fell
within the narrow definition of an exchange contract, the court held that such a letter
of credit was not an exchange contract. J. Zeevi & Sons Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank
(Uganda) Ltd., 37 N.Y.2d 220, 229, 333 N.E.2d 168, 371 N.Y.S.2d 892, 900, cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 866 (1975).
172. Wilson, Smithett & Cope Ltd. v. Terruzzi, [1976] 1 Q.B. 683, 709-14 (C.A.).
The House of Lords upheld this holding. United City Merchants v. Royal Bank of
Canada, 1 App. Cas. 188 (1983). The English Court of Appeal, however, originally
adopted a broad definition of exchange contracts. Sharif v. Azad, [1967] 1 Q.B. 605
(C.A.). Lord Diplock held that courts should liberally construe exchange contracts to
protect the financial resources of a country. Id. at 618.
173. Wilson, Smithett & Cope Ltd. v. Terruzzi, [1976] 1 Q.B. 683 (C.A.).
174. Id. at 714.
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ident dealing in metals. 75 Terruzzi instructed the plaintiff to sell short
1200 tons of zinc for three months delivery. 176 The price of zinc rose
substantially, and the plaintiff demanded a deposit from the defendant
in accordance with the terms of the contract. 77 When Terruzzi refused
to honor this demand, the plaintiff closed the account, selling the metal
back to the defendant at the prevailing market price.' 78 The English
Court of Appeal entered a judgment for the plaintiff for the costs of
covering a short sale.
179
The British Court of Appeal, refusing to adopt a broader interpreta-
tion of the term "exchange contract," dismissed Terruzzi's allegation
that the contract affected the exchange resources of Italy. 80 Noting
that the contract only called for payment in sterling, the court con-
cluded that the contract was not an exchange contract contemplating
an exchange of currencies.' 8' This narrow reading of the term "ex-
change contract" implies that most financial transactions do not fall
within the scope of article VIII, section 2(b). 82 The English court also
rejected the defendant's argument that transactions involving merchan-
dise or commodities are classified as exchange contracts. 83 The court
175. Id. at 709-10. Under Italian exchange control laws, no Italian resident could
incur debts to nonresidents without ministerial authority. Id. at 710. Terruzzi did not
obtain such permission before establishing an account with Wilson, Smithett & Cope
Ltd. Id.
176. Id. The court explained that Terruzzi sold metal that he did not have to
London dealers at a high price for delivery three months later. Id. He never intended to
deliver, but rather wanted to buy a similar quantity back from the London dealers at a
lower price before the delivery date. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 711. Upon the satisfaction of the sale to Terruzzi, a debt of 195,000
pounds sterling still remained on the account. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 714 (dismissing the appeal because the contracts were not exchange
contracts but rather contracts, for the sale and purchase of metal).
181. Id.
182. See COURTS II, supra note 170, at 393 (explaining that forward exchange
contracts where one party promises to exchange one currency for another constitute
one of the few financial transactions included within the scope of a narrow interpreta-
tion of the term exchange contract); see also Gold, "Exchange Contracts" Exchange
Control, and the IMF Articles of Agreement: Some Animadversions on Wilson,
Smithett & Cope Ltd. v. Terruzzi, 33 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 777, 786 (1984) [hereinaf-
ter Gold, Some Animadversions on Wilson, Smithett & Cope Ltd. v. Terruzzi] (noting
that a loan agreement where one party lends money in return for repayment in the
same currency is excluded from the definition of an exchange contract under a literal
interpretation); Rendell, The Allied Bank Case and its Aftermath, 20 INT'L LAW. 819,
827 (1986) (remarking that a promissory note is not classified as an exchange contract
under a restrictive formulation of the term).
183. Wilson, Smithett & Cope Ltd. v. Terruzzi, [1976] 1 Q.B. 683, 713 (C.A.).
The court noted that the IMF enacted article VIII, section 2(b) to curb the evil of
currency speculation. Id. at 713. Contracts for the sales of merchandise or commodities
did not cause this evil. Id. The court held that the Bretton Woods Agreement pre-
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did, however, create a narrow exception for commodities contracts that
are, in effect, disguised monetary transactions for the exchange of
currencies.""
In United City Merchants v. Royal Bank of Canada,180 the House of
Lords, applying the narrow exception, examined the underlying sub-
stance of a sales transaction and discovered a disguised monetary trans-
action involving an exchange of currencies violating Peruvian exchange
control regulations. 18  Glass Fibres and Equipment Ltd. (Glass Fibres),
an English company, sold a plant to Vitrorefuerzos (Vitro), a Peruvian
company, for $662,086.18? The buyer arranged for its Peruvian bank,
Banco Continental, S.A., to supply an irrevocable letter of credit con-
firmed at the Royal Bank of Canada (Royal Bank). 88 Glass Fibres and
Vitro, however, devised a scheme requiring Glass Fibres to sell the
cluded any restrictions on valid commodities or sales contracts and stressed the promo-
tion of international trade under article I (ii). Id. Article VI, section 3 and article VIII,
section 2(a), coupled with article XIX(1), prohibits any IMF member from imposing
restrictions on payments "due in connection with foreign trade, other current business,
including services, and normal short term banking credit facilities." Id. at 713-14.
The IMF, however, can approve a member's restrictions on current international
trade transactions under article VIII, section 2(a), but the court of appeal took the
position that only minimal restrictions are in the interests of trade. Gold, Some Ani-
madversions on Wilson, Smithett & Cope Ltd. v. Terruzzi, supra note 182, at 802-03.
The rationale of the Court of Appeal lacks merit because it failed to meaningfully
consider the tenets of articles I (ii), (v), and (vi). These tenets include the following
provisions: promoting international monetary collaboration, establishing confidence in
members through allowing them to correct maladjustments in their balance of pay-
ments, and lessening the degree of disequilibrium in the balance of payments of mem-
ber countries. Agreement, supra note 24, art. I (ii), (v), (vi). The Court of Appeal
conducted a cursory analysis of these tenets, concluding that their primary objective
was the promotion of trade. F. MANN, supra note 101, at 388. A short-term, IMF-
approved trade restriction promotes these additional tenets. CouRTs II, supra note 170,
at 217.
184. See Wilson, Smithett & Cope Ltd. v. Terruzzi, [1976] 1 Q.B. 683, 718 (C.A.)
(citing Nussbaum as arguing that contracts involving securities or merchandise are not
exchange contracts, unless they are monetary transactions in disguise); see Nussbaum,
supra note 169, at 427 (containing the original statement of this exception and noting
that sales or commodities contracts are enforceable even if they are illegal under the
law of the country of the currency); see also F. MANN, supra note 101, at 388 (discuss-
ing how the definition of "contracts in disguise" distorts reality and creates
uncertainty).
185. United City Merchants v. Royal Bank of Canada, [1983] 1 App. Cas. 168,
188.
186. Id. at 188, 190.
187. Id. at 180-81.
188. Id. at 181. A documentary credit is any arrangement where a bank, acting on
the request or instructions of a customer or applicant for credit, either 1) makes a
payment to, or to the order to, a third party or is to pay or accept bills of exchange
drawn by the beneficiary, or 2) authorizes another bank to do so, against certain docu-
ments, provided that the parties comply with the terms of the credit. Uniform Customs
and Practice for Documentary Credits, art. 2 (Int'l Chamber of Commerce No. 400,
1983).
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plant to Vitro at twice the actual cost."' Glass Fibres, after receiving
the inflated amount of United States currency, would then remit half of
the amount received to the subsidiary of Vitro located in Miami, Flor-
ida.190 This scheme would have allowed Vitro to convert Peruvian soles
into United States dollars in violation of Peruvian exchange control
regulations. 1 ' The Royal Bank, however, refused to honor a call on the
letter of credit supplied pursuant to the sales contract.9 2
United City Merchants (UCM), an assignee of the rights of Glass
Fibres under the letter of credit, sued Royal Bank for payment.1
9 3
Royal Bank argued that the sales contract was unenforceable under
article VIII, section 2(b) because it was an exchange contract.19 4 The
House of Lords agreed with Royal Bank, allowing UCM to recover on
the part of the contract representing the true purchase price of the
equipment, but refused to allow UCM any recovery for that part of the
transaction in excess of the genuine purchase price.195 This part of the
contract represented the disguised monetary transaction.9' The signifi-
cance of this decision is two-fold. First, the House of Lords recognized
the necessity of relying on the substance rather than the form of a con-
tract in determining whether the contract is designed to evade the ex-
change control regulation of an IMF member.9 7 Second, the House of
Lords acknowledged that courts may merge a series of related contrac-
tual arrangements'9 " and conclude that the series constitutes a single




192. Id. at 181-82. The letter of credit required that a carrier ship all goods on or
before December 15, 1976. Id. at 181. The carrier subsequently shipped the goods on
December 16, 1976. Id. The carrier's agent, however, presented fraudulently backdated
bills of lading to Royal Bank, the confirming bank, without the knowledge of the sell-
ers. Id. at 181-82.
193. Id. at 170-71.
194. Id. at 178.
195. Id. at 190.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 188. If the House of Lords limited its review to the form of the contract
between Glass Fibres and Royal Bank under the documentary credit, it would not have
labeled the contract a currency exchange contract. Id. at 189-90.
198. Id. at 179. Lord Stephenson, of the British Court of Appeal, analyzed the case
as encompassing four contractual relationships: 1) between Glass Fibres and Vitro for
the sale and purchase of the plant; 2) between Vitro and Banco Continental (the
buyer's Peruvian bank), who opened an irrevocable letter of credit benefitting Glass
Fibres for the account of Vitro; 3) between Banco Continental and Royal, confirming
the letter of credit; 4) between Royal and Glass Fibres, beneficiary under the letter of




exchange contract. 199 Consequently, the decision of the House of Lords
suggests that contracts other than those concluded for an exchange of
one currency for another may fall within the scope of article VIII, sec-
tion 2(b).2 00
Many of the courts located in IMF member countries interpreting
the meaning of an exchange contract under article VIII, section 2(b)
have adopted a broader definition of exchange contracts. Courts in
Germany201 and France20 2 define exchange contracts as those affecting
the exchange resources of the member country imposing the restric-
tions, that is, a "contract which, when performed, would increase or
decrease in an economic sense the amount of foreign exchange or other
international reserves that are under the control of the country whose
currency is involved. 203 Under this broad interpretation, one commen-
tator has suggested that exchange contracts are transactions that affect
the international financial position of a country. 0
In Lessinger v. Mirau,20 5 the German court of appeal accepted the
broad interpretation of an exchange contract. The German court held
that an exchange contract is a contract prejudicing the exchange re-
sources of a member country. 0 6 In Mirau, two Austrian citizens en-
199. United City Merchants v. Royal Bank of Canada, [1983] 1 App. Cas. 168,
179; Gold, The Fund Agreement in the Courts - XIX, 31 IMF STAFF PAPERS 179, 186
(1984). Contra F. MANN, supra note 101, at 389-90 (asserting that courts should not
merge several contracts and conclude that, as a whole, they constitute a single ex-
change contract).
200. Note, The Unenforceability of International Contracts Violating Foreign Ex-
change Regulations: Article VIII, Section 2(b) of the International Monetary Fund
Agreement, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 967, 988 (1985).
201. See Lessinger v. Mirau, 22 I.L.R. 725, 725 (Oberlandesgericht, Schleswig-
Holstein 1954) (holding that a loan agreement between two Austrian citizens is an
exchange contract); Judgment of April 9, 1962, 21 WM 602 (Wertpapier mit-
tleilunger) (holding that a contract for commission between German and Austrian
manufacturers was an exchange contract); Clearing Dollars Case, 22 I.L.R. 730, 731
(Landgericht, Hamburg 1954) (defining an exchange contract as a contract involving
the currency of an IMF member).
202. See De Boer v. Ducro, 47 I.L.R. 46, 51-52 (Cour d'appel, Paris 1961) (inter-
preting an assignment contract between a Dutch resident and a German resident as an
exchange contract).
203. Williams, supra note 169, at 337-38. Contracts that increase or decrease for-
eign exchange or other international reserves at the time of their performance include
contracts for the purchase or sale of merchandise or services, international loan agree-
ments, and contracts for the exchange of one currency for another. Baker, supra note
168, at 253-54.
204. Silard, Money and Foreign Exchange, in 17 INT'L ENCY. Cobtp. L. 1, 58
(1975); see De Boer v. Ducro, 47 I.L.R. 46, 51 (Cour d'appel, Paris 1961) (analyzing
the question of whether a contract affects a country's exchange resources).
205. Lessinger v. Mirau, 22 I.L.R. 725, 725 (Oberlandesgericht, Schleswig-Hol-
stein 1954).
206. Id. at 727; see De Boer v. Ducro, 47 I.L.R. 46, 51 (Cour d'appel, Paris 1961)
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tered into a contract requiring the defendant to pay 30,000 Austrian
schillings in monthly installments to the plaintiff in exchange for a loan
of an equivalent amount.2 °7 The plaintiff loaned the defendant $1,000
which is the equivalent of 30,000 Austrian schillings. °8 When the de-
fendant did not repay the loan, the plaintiff initiated suit to recover the
$1,000.209
At trial, the defendant raised article VIII, section 2(b), claiming that
an exchange contract existed, and that if enforced, would violate Aus-
trian exchange controls. 210 The German Court of Appeal, applying the
broad interpretation of article VIII, section 2(b), refused to enforce the
contract because the Austrian exchange control regulations prohibited
the export of foreign exchange without a license, and the $1,000 was
illegally exported for the loan. 21' Amounts of foreign exchange under
Austrian control decreased as a result of this contract.212 Consequently,
banks litigating the merits of a freeze affecting Eurodollar accounts in
countries that adhere to the broad interpretation of article VIII, section
2(b) should find it easier to convince courts that a Eurodollar arrange-
ment constitutes an exchange contract under article VIII, section 2(b).
The ability to fit a Eurodollar arrangement into the category of an
exchange contract ultimately depends on the interpretive analysis the
court selects. In jurisdictions adhering to the narrow interpretation of
article VIII, section 2(b), a United States bank seeking to argue the
IMF defense must integrate all related contracts of the Eurodollar ar-
rangement into an underlying scheme and affirmatively demonstrate
that the real objective is to exchange the currency of a depositor into
United States dollars. In countries adopting the broader definition of
(asserting that the court must analyze a contract according to whether the contract
will, in any way, affect the currency resources of the member imposing the exchange
control regulations).
207. Lessinger v. Mirau, 22 I.L.R. 725, 725 (Oberlandesgericht, Schleswig-Hol-
stein 1954).
208. Id.
209. Id. Because the defendant resided in the Federal Republic of Germany at the
time the action commenced, the plaintiff sued for the Deutsch mark equivalent of
$1,000. Id.
210. Baker, supra note 168, at 254.
211. Id. at 254-55. The court defined an exchange contract as one affecting the
exchange resources of the member implementing the exchange control regulations. Les-
singer v. Mirau, 22 I.L.R. 725, 727 (Oberlandesgericht Schleswig-Holstein 1954). The
German Court of Appeal noted that a broad interpretation of an exchange contract is
the only interpretation consistent with the purposes behind controlling exchange re-
sources. Id.
212. Baker, supra note 168, at 254; see J. GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT IN THE
COURTS 91 (1962) [hereinafter COURTS I] (noting that the defendant was unable to
return the amount borrowed to the Austrian government).
[VOL. 3:241
LIBYAN ASSET FREEZE
article VIII, section 2(b), however, a United States bank need only
show that the Eurodollar transaction will have a cognizable effect on
United States exchange resources or on the international financial posi-
tion of the United States.
b. Eurodollar Arrangements as Involving United States Currency
The directors of the IMF have declined to interpret the meaning of
an exchange contract, and they have never defined the phrase "involve
the currency of a member."21 3 Once again, courts of member states
have developed their own interpretations. Not surprisingly, interpreta-
tions of this phrase correspond directly with the interpretations ac-
corded exchange contracts." 4
In defining the phrase "involve the currency of a member," the first
question to examine is whether a Eurodollar qualifies as United States
currency. Technically, a Eurodollar is neither a coin nor a note. 15 In-
stead, a Eurodollar is simply a dollar-denominated bank deposit located
outside the United States. Some commentators have argued, therefore,
that a Eurodollar does not constitute United States currency.21 Conse-
quently, commercial banks claiming that a Eurodollar arrangement
does involve United States currency, should argue that although a
Eurodollar is not currency in the common sense, the Eurodollar ar-
rangement does involve United States currency because the depositor
has a claim to repayment in dollars or United States currency.
217
After defining what constitutes United States currency, it becomes
necessary to determine what the term "involvement" means. Several
courts have held that a currency is involved if the contract either ex-
plicitly names it the currency of repayment or performance of the con-
tract necessarily requires payment of that currency.218 Confusion, how-
213. R. EDWARDS, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COLLABORATION 484, 486 (1985)
[hereinafter COLLABORATION].
214. See COURTS II, supra note 170, at 214 (discussing limitations on the meaning
of the phrase "involve the currency of a member" if a court supports a literal interpre-
tation of an exchange contract).
215. PAYMENT OBLIGATIONS, supra note 123, at 2.
216. F. MANN, supra note 101, at 61; PAYMENT OBLIGATIONS, supra note 123, at
2.
217. See PAYMENT OBLIGATIONS, supra note 123, at 2 (explaining that a Eurodol-
lar is a dollar deposit where the depositor has a claim to repayment in United States
dollars).
218. See A. NUSSBAUM, MONEY IN THE LAW NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 543-
44 (rev. ed. 1950) [hereinafter MONEY IN THE LAW] (recommending this literal inter-
pretation of the phrase "involve the currency of a member"). But see F. MANN, supra
note 101, at 391 (arguing that the phrase "which involve the currency of a member"
does not refer to the denomination of a specific currency in an exchange contract, but
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ever, surrounds the second prong of this definition. British courts, in
particular, fail to draw a distinction between necessary and unneces-
sary involvement.
2 1 9
In Terruzzi, the contract between an Italian resident and a British
resident called for the use of pounds sterling, not lire.220 The British
Court of Appeal noted that performance of the contract may have re-
quired that either one of the parties use lire.2 21 The House of Lords, in
United City Merchants, also noted that although Peruvian soles were
never named as the currency of use in the contract, their use was in-
deed necessary for performance.222 Looking at the entire transaction
and the evidence presented, the court found that the use of Peruvian
soles was implicitly necessary in effecting the transaction because the
entire purpose behind the contract was the fraudulent conversion of Pe-
ruvian soles into United States dollars.
2 23
An insufficient basis exists for developing a sound legal distinction
between Terruzzi and United City Merchants concerning currency in-
volvement. The use of Italian lire in the Terruzzi transaction was as
necessary as the use of Peruvian soles in the United City Merchants
transaction. In the former decision, defendant Terruzzi was required to
exchange lire for pounds sterling to receive the currency mandated in
the transaction. 24 In the latter decision, Vitro, the purchasing corpora-
tion, was also required to exchange Peruvian soles for United States
dollars to effectuate the transaction.2 5 Any distinction in reasoning
seemingly lies on the perceived intent of the parties engaged in each
transaction. 2 6 Even where the performance of the contract requires the
to the financial area where the transaction has economic effects).
219. See Wilson, Smithett & Cope Ltd. v. Terruzzi, [1976] 1 Q.B. 683, 719 (C.A.)
(stating that courts should not read the phrase "involvement of currency" restrictively,
but should link this phrase to the meaning of exchange contracts).
220. Wilson, Smithett & Cope Ltd. v. Terruzzi, [1976] 1 Q.B. 683, 719 (C.A.).
See generally Weston Banking Corp. v. Turkiye Garanti Bankasi A.S., 57 N.Y.2d 315,
684, 442 N.E.2d 1195, 456 N.Y.S.2d 684 (1982) (finding that a promissory note call-
ing for repayment in foreign currency does not violate Turkish currency control regula-
tions because it requires repayment in Swiss francs, not Turkish lire).
221. Wilson, Smithett & Cope Ltd. v. Terruzzi, [1976] 1 Q.B. 683, 719 (C.A.),
222. United City Merchants v. Royal Bank of Canada, [1983] 1 App. Cas. 168,
182, 190.
223. Id.; see CouRTs II, supra note 170, at 333 (noting that if the parties carried
out the transaction, the Peruvian buyers would have to repay the debt to their Peruvian
bank through the exchange of Peruvian soles for United States dollars).
224. Wilson, Smithett & Cope Ltd. v. Terruzzi, [1976] 1 Q.B. 683, 719 (C.A.).
225. United City Merchants v. Royal Bank of Canada, [1983] 1 App. Cas. 168,
182.
226. See id. (observing that the parties knowingly intended to violate Peruvian ex-
change control regulations and, therefore, the transactions involved Peruvian soles, the
restricted currency); Wilson, Smithett & Cope Ltd. v. Terruzzi, [1976] 1 Q.B. 683,
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conversion of restricted currency, English courts refuse to admit in-
volvement of that currency if the scheme underlying the transaction is
not designed to effect an unlawful exchange. Consequently, whether a
currency is involved in an exchange contract depends solely on whether
the parties intended the contract to circumvent the relevant exchange
control regulations. This standard makes the issue of currency involve-
ment ambiguous and unpredictable.
The courts of all IMF member states do not apply as restrictive an
interpretation of involvement. Many courts view the phrase more
broadly, indicating that the currency of a member state involves an
exchange contract if that contract affects either the exchange resources
or balance of payments of the restricting member . 27 Thus, a United
States bank seeking to invoke the IMF defense can present this inter-
pretion of currency involvement, if the circumstances do not warrant a
successful argument under the literal interpretation of the phrase.
One commentator, favoring a broader interpretation of currency in-
volvement, argues that determining whether the currency of a member
country is involved in the transfer of an asset to or from a nonresident
nation requires consideration of whether a resident of the member state
enters into the exchange contract or deals with assets within the terri-
tory of that member.228 Courts in Germany and France rely on this
interpretation in their decisions addressing currency involvement. In
the Clearing Dollars Case,229 the plaintiff, a German firm, contracted
to sell chemicals to the defendants, Belgian residents, at the price of
forty-six United States clearing dollars230 payable under Belgian-West
German Clearing. 31 The defendants, failing to acquire the import li-
cense required under Belgian exchange control regulations, did not
purchase the chemicals. 32 Consequently, the plaintiff sued the defend-
ants seeking damages for breach of contract.233
The defendants, raising the IMF defense, stated that if the exchange
contract was performed, it would involve the currency of Belgium, Bel-
gian francs.213 The Hamburg Provincial Court accepted this argument
710-11 (C.A.) (noting that neither party knowingly intended to violate Italian ex-
change control regulations and, thus, the transaction did not involve lire, the restricted
currency).
227. COURTS II, supra note 170, at 214.
228. J. GOLD, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND PRIVATE BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS 25 (IMF Pamphlet Series, No. 3, 1965).




233. Id. at 730.
234. Id. at 731.
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and held that an exchange contract existed that involved Belgian cur-
rency.235 In so holding, the German court analyzed the residence of the
parties, noting that the contract involved residents of Belgium."' Fur-
thermore, the court noted that because payment in Belgian francs was
required under the clearing arrangements, performance of the contract
involved the foreign exchange reserves of Belgium.23
In De Boer v. Ducro,2 38 Moojen, a Dutch resident, assigned shares in
a French company to a German resident for francs, violating Dutch
exchange control regulations.13 Moojen's widow sought the enforce-
ment of a Dutch judgment finding that the assignment of shares with-
out prior Dutch authorization was void.24 0 The Paris Court of Appeal
enforced the Dutch judgment in France, characterizing the assignment
as an exchange contract involving Dutch currency. 4 The Court
stressed that Moojen was a resident of the Netherlands at the time he
entered into the agreement, 242 and also emphasized that the assignment
could affect the exchange resources of the Netherlands. 2 43 Conse-
quently, the French court took a more liberal approach on the meaning
of currency involvement.
In future litigation, United States commercial banks arguing that
Eurodollar arrangements are exchange contracts involving United
States currency will have to structure their arguments to fit within ei-
ther a broad or narrow interpretation of currency involvement, depend-
ing on the jurisdiction. United States banks can claim that because
most Eurodollar contracts name the United States dollar as the me-
dium of repayment, 4 the issue of necessity should never arise under a
narrow reading of currency involvement. Banks can also argue that
Eurodollar contracts involve the exchange resources of the United
States. More specifically, United States banks can claim that a
235. Id. at 731.
236. Id. at 730.
237. COURTS I, supra note 212, at 84; see Clearing Dollars Case, 22 I.L.R. at 730,
731-32 (noting that payment in Belgium francs under Belgium-West German clearing
defeats the purpose of the Belgium exchange control regulations).
238. De Boer v. Ducro, 47 I.L.R. 46 (Cour d'appel, Paris, 1961).
239. Id. at 52.
240. Id. at 48; see COURTS I, supra note 212, at 145 (analyzing the res judicata
effect of the prior Dutch adjudication of the article VIII, section 2(b) issue on the Paris
Court of Appeal).
241. De Boer v. Ducro, 47 I.L.R. 46, 51 (Cour d'appel, Paris, 1961).
242. Id. at 50.
243. Id. at 51; see Baker, supra note 168, at 258 (observing that the assignment as
a whole effectively diminished Dutch foreign exchange assets).
244. See Carreau, supra note 67, at 159 (stating that a Eurodollar deposit refers to
a deposit of United States dollars and that the currency of repayment is almost always
the currency initially deposited).
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Eurodollar arrangement involves assets located in the United States
and that a United States resident entered into the Eurodollar contract.
c. United States Asset Freeze as an Exchange Control Regulation
Assuming that a particular Eurodollar arrangement qualifies as an
exchange contract involving United States currency, the question then
becomes whether the contract violates United States exchange control
regulations. This determination requires consideration of whether a po-
litically motivated United States asset freeze is a proper exchange con-
trol regulation. The IMF is authorized to determine whether political
asset freezes constitute proper exchange control regulations under arti-
cle VIII, section 2(b), and whether these regulations are consistent
with the Articles of Agreement. 4 5
The Executive Directors of the IMF have not promulgated a formal
interpretation of exchange control regulations. 24 1 Generally, restrictions
on capital movements under article VI, section 3, enactments under
articles VIII, section 2(a) and section 3, and monetary measures are
included within the definition of exchange control regulations. Under
article VI, section 3, an IMF member may introduce restrictions on
capital movements without the approval of the IMF.248 To impose re-
strictions on payments or transfers for current international transac-
tions under article VIII, section 2(a), however, a member must seek
IMF approval. 249 Deciding whether to grant approval requires the IMF
to look at the form and technical character rather than the purpose of
the regulations.250
The issue remains whether asset freezes are classified as restrictions
on capital movements or as restrictions on the making of payments and
transfers for current international transactions. The IMF has distin-
guished between a payment for a current international transaction and
payment for a capital movement. Article XXX(d) defines payments for
current international transactions, excluding those transactions for pur-
245. See Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1120 (5th Cir. 1985) (detailing
the IMF approval process that determines whether Mexican exchange controls are con-
sistent with the Articles of Agreement).
246. Edwards, supra note 9, at 883.
247. Silard, Exchange Controls and External Indebtedness: Are the Bretton
Woods Concepts Still Workable?, 1984 Ahi. Soc'y INTl' L. PROC. 240, 241.
248. Agreement, supra note 24, art. VII, sec. 3; see GUIDE, supra note 150, at 21
(observing that members can restrict capital movements unless such measures hinder
payments or transfers for current international transactions).
249. Agreement, supra note 24, art. VIII, sec. 2(a).
250. See Extraterritorial Enforcement, supra note 169, at 353 (asserting that the
classification of an exchange control regulation is dependent on its technical character).
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poses of transferring capital, to encompass, among other things, all
payments due in connection with short-term banking and credit facili-
ties, payments relative to foreign trade, payments due as interest on
loans, and payments representing net income from other investments. 1
Restrictions on capital movements, however, are defined as payments
and receipts that are outside the scope of article XXX(d),252 including
transfers of funds between countries for investment or speculation. 5 3
Determining whether an asset freeze, a form of an exchange control
regulation, is a restriction on capital movements or a control on current
transactions requires an examination of the language of such enact-
ments. The language in prior United States exchange controls prohib-
ited United States residents from paying, withdrawing, exporting, or
dealing with the property interest of a nonresident . 5 These restrictions
defined property interest to include money, checks, drafts, bank depos-
its, indebtedness, goods, letters of credit, interest, and other periodic
payments. 5 Some argue, therefore, that this form of an exchange con-
trol regulation constitutes a restriction on capital transfers.25 6 Addition-
ally, some argue that these regulations are restrictions on current trans-
actions under article VIII, section 2(a) because the controls retard
payments and transfers in connection with loans, hinder payments due
in connection with foreign trade, and affect short-term banking under
article XXX(d). 257 Therefore, the United States, the country imposing
the particular restriction, is only required to seek approval of those en-
actments relating to current transactions.
Many scholars defining exchange control regulations, however, look
to the purpose for imposing controls, rather than their technical
form.258 Exchange control regulations include regulations enacted to
251. Agreement, supra note 24, art. XXX(d); see COLLABORATION, supra note
213, at 395 (remarking that the banking provisions enumerated in article XXX(d) do
not cover direct investments).
252. Agreement, supra note 24, art. XXX(d).
253. J. HORSEFIELD, supra note 150, at 22.
254. See 31 C.F.R. § 550.209 (1987) (describing the prohibitions of transactions
involving property where Libya has an interest); see also id. § 535.201 (identifying
prohibitions of transactions where Iran or its entities have an interest).
255. See id. § 550.314 (defining property interest in the Libyan Sanctions Regula-
tions); see also id. § 535.311 (identifying all property interests in the Iranian Sanction
Regulations).
256. See Pardieu, The Carter Freeze Order: Specific Problems Relating to the In-
ternational Monetary Fund, 9 INT'L Bus. LAW. 97, 99 (1981) (characterizing the Ira-
nian exchange control regulations as restrictions on capital movements).
257. Edwards, supra note 9, at 871.
258. See Pardieu, supra note 256, at 98 (asserting that a reasonable interpretation




protect the financial resources of the country imposing them. 2 9 Under
this definition, a regulation adopted for noneconomic reasons does not
fall within the definition of a proper exchange control regulation.2 0 For
example, trading with the enemy regulations21 and United States ex-
change controls adopted during World War I162 do not qualify as ex-
change control regulations within the scope of article VIII, section
2(b). 3
The IMF adopted Decision (52/51), a procedure to regulate restric-
tions based on political motives in 1952.21 The IMF has jurisdiction
over all currency restrictions on current international payments and
transfers invoked for national security reasons.260 If restrictions within
the scope of article VIII, section 2(a) are imposed for security reasons
only, the country imposing these restrictions must seek formal approval
from the IMF Directors. 66 A member must notify the IMF of the re-
strictions within thirty days of imposing the restrictions. 07 If the IMF
does not inform the member of its dissatisfaction with the restrictions
within thirty days, the restrictions are presumed valid under the Agree-
ment.26 8 Ironically, under this procedure, the reasons for imposing the
259. F. MANN, supra note 101, at 393.
260. Id.
261. Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, ch. 106, 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(1)(A)
(1982).
262. See Exec. Order No. 8,389, 3 C.F.R. § 644, 645 (1940) (promulgating the
freezing of Nonvegian and Danish assets in the United States, preventing Nazi seizure
of such assets); see also Roth, Statutory Basis for the Iranian Asset Freeze, 3 CORP.
L. REv. 165, 168 (1980) (stating that assets were frozen under the Trading with the
Enemy Act for the first time in 1940).
263. MONEY IN THE LAW, supra note 218, at 455-57.
264. SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 27, at 253. This decision dates back to 1950
when the United States imposed restrictions on China and Korea. CouRTs 11, supra
note 170, at 366. President Truman declared a national emergency under the Trading
with the Enemy Act when China entered the Korean War in 1950. TREASuRY PAI-
PHLET, supra note 1, at 7. Subsequently, the Treasury Department promulgated the
Foreign Asset Control Regulations that apply to North Korea, Cambodia, and South
Vietnam. Id. China and the United States reached a settlement on May 7, 1979, re-
leasing $80.5 million in frozen Chinese assets. Id.
265. SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 27, at 253.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 253-54. During the Iranian asset freeze, the United States executive
directors reported the Iranian restrictions to the Executive Director of the IMF and
invoked Decision 144. CouRTs II, supra note 170, at 361. The freeze occurred on No-
vember 14, 1979, and the United States circulated its memorandum to the IMF Execu-
tive Board on November 29, 1979. Id. The IMF did not object within the 30 day limit.
Edwards, supra note 9, at 875. On April 7, and 17, 1980, President Carter amended
the Iranian regulations. Id. at 872. The United States notified the Board of these
amendments on April 28, 1980, and the Board took no action within the 30 day limit.
Id. at 875-76.
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restrictions are irrelevant. 69
Unfortunately, the IMF approval process has one major flaw. United
States banks relying on the IMF defense in potential litigation involv-
ing national exchange controls will never know whether the IMF has
approved the controls prior to any litigation between the bank and its
depositor.170 The IMF does not immediately issue press releases to
banks informing the banks of its decision to approve exchange controls
on current transactions adopted for economic or security reasons. 1 In
addition, it does not publicly announce its approval of exchange control
regulations in either its Annual Report or in its Annual Report on Ex-
change Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. 2 Nevertheless, fol-
lowing the commencement of litigation between a bank and its deposi-
tor, the IMF will respond to inquiries from courts or parties on whether
the IMF approved particular exchange controls.273 Consequently, al-
though banks can examine precedent to determine whether the IMF
will treat a Eurodollar as an exchange contract, the banks cannot ob-
tain information detailing the IMF's approval of an exchange control
prior to litigation.
The IMF, therefore, should establish procedures that open the ap-
proval process to the financial communities of member states, provide
clear guidelines of the approval process to interested private parties
such as banks, and maintain the degree of confidentiality necesssary to
protect the interests of the IMF. These procedures would require a
bank to analyze its nation's exchange controls following their enact-
ment and would mandate that the bank then determine how these con-
trols affect its interests. Following a timely review, if the bank finds
that these exchange controls hinder withdrawals, transfers, or payments
to its depositor and this depositor maintains enormous accounts with
the bank, then the bank could prepare a special request to the IMF to
obtain information on whether the IMF approved the exchange control
restrictions. The IMF could require the submission of this special re-
quest for information relating to the approval of exchange control regu-
lations within a certain fixed period following the enactment of the reg-
ulations. The IMF, while reviewing each bank's request on a case-by-
case basis, would either reject the request or send the requested infor-
269. SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 27, at 253.
270. Zamora, Exchange Controls and External Indebtedness: Are the Bretton
Woods Concepts Still Workable?, 1984 AM. Soc'y INT'L L. PROC. 240, 249.
271. Id.
272. RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (RE-




mation. Additionally, the IMF could establish helpful guidelines for fu-
ture applicants detailing the proper procedures for making these re-
quests. Therefore, banks informed of an IMF decision to approve asset
freezes imposed for security reasons can, prior to any potential litiga-
tion, structure an IMF defense more precisely. Moreover, these proce-
dures will facilitate greater cooperation between private parties and the
IMF.
If a Eurodollar transaction is an exchange contract involving United
States currency, it cannot contradict United States exchange control
regulations. In identifying proper exchange control regulations, some
jurisdictions look to the technical language of the exchange restrictions,
whereas other jurisdictions look to the purposes behind the enactment
of the exchange controls. Consequently, it is more difficult to classify
an asset freeze under the latter definition than the former.
d. The United States Asset Freeze as Exchange Control Regulations
Consistent with the IMF Agreement
Although the IMF may recognize a particular United States asset
freeze as an exchange control regulation, it may still refuse to concede
that the freeze is consistent with the purpose and the spirit of the IMF
Agreement. If the IMF has approved a member's restrictions, however,
the regulations are usually consistent with the Agreement. 27 4 Since
1949, the IMF has argued that it should advise all members on
whether their exchange control regulations were imposed consistently
with the Agreement. 75 Various national courts, however, disagree on
whether express approval from the IMF is required.
United States courts have held that advice from the IMF is determi-
native of the consistency of exchange control regulations.270 Similarly,
English courts have deferred to evidence of IMF approval relating to
the consistency of exchange control regulations with the agreement. 7
Belgian courts, however, have required a stricter proof of specific IMF
approval of exchange control regulations. 78 German courts have noted
274. COLLABORATION, supra note 213, at 483.
275. SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 27, at 252.
276. Southwestern Shipping Corp. v. National City Bank of New York, 173
N.Y.S.2d 509, 523, 11 Misc.2d 397, 410 (1958). The IMF advised the New York
Supreme Court that Italian exchange control regulations were consistent with the
Agreement. Id.
277. Wilson, Smithett & Cope Ltd. v. Terruzzi, [19761 1 Q.B. 683, 719 (C.A.).
The British court also indicated that in the future, it would listen to expert evidence on
the effect of the exchange control regulations. Id.
278. Emek v. Bossers & Mouthaan, 22 I.L.R. 722, 724 (Belgium Commercial Tri-
bunal of Courtrai 1953). Contra COURTS I, supra note 212, at 82 (criticizing the
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that exchange control restrictions can be consistent with the Articles of
Agreement without express approval from the IMF."' Under the Ger-
man approach, if the IMF approves the general nature of the regula-
tions or the customary state practice mandates the validity of such ex-
change controls, then the exchange control regulations are consistent
with the IMF Agreement.280
Finally, if the IMF approves an asset freeze as a proper exchange
control regulation, it may also determine that such regulations are con-
sistent with the IMF Agreement. Some jurisdictions require the litigat-
ing parties to obtain advice from the IMF on whether the IMF has
approved particular exchange control regulations, whereas other juris-
dictions may not require this information from the IMF.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION IN LIBYAN ARAB
FOREIGN BANK V. BANKERS TRUST CO.
The underlying reasons behind the decision of the English court in
Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust are two-fold. The British
Court's acceptance of the United States Eurodollar defense could have
produced a major disruption in the Eurodollar market. Fearing the po-
litical risks involved in holding Eurodollar deposits, potential Eurodol-
lar depositors would not invest in such a market281 and those depositors
already holding Eurodollar deposits would withdraw their funds, plac-
ing them in alternative financial markets." 2 These actions ultimately
could have led to the crash of the Eurodollar market; the United King-
dom therefore would have lost its standing as the premier holder of
Eurodollar deposits. United States banks may then become outcasts in
the international financial community. Furthermore, the United States
dollar could lose its status as a premier reserve currency. 83
The decision of the court in Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers
Trust also showed that the United States cannot act unilaterally in in-
Belgium court for requiring specific proof of IMF approval).
279. Clearing Dollars Case, 22 I.L.R. 730, 731 (Landgericht, Hamburg 1954).
280. Id.
281. See Financial Times, Sept. 24, 1987, at 8, col. 1 (understanding that a poten-
tial Eurodollar depositor has relevant concerns regarding the security of the Eurodollar
market); Carswell, Economic Sanctions and the Iran Experience, 60 FOREIGN AFF.
247, 262-63 (1981-82) (addressing the concerns of United States bankers during the
Iranian asset freeze that OPEC countries would reduce their holding of assets in the
Eurodollar market).
282. See Lissakers, Money and Manipulation, 44 FOREIGN POL'Y 107, 120-21
(noting the concerns of Treasury officials and bankers, during the Iranian asset freeze,
that investors, especially from the Middle East, would look toward European financial
institutions as an alternative).
283. Id. at 122.
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voking asset freezes without first obtaining the assistance of other coun-
tries. The United States should seek the cooperation of all countries
that are holders of Eurodollar accounts before freezing accounts.,,"
Countries, holding these accounts, may agree to fight international ter-
rorism through allowing the United States to freeze Eurodollar ac-
counts temporarily until that particular country involved in terrorism
stops these violent actions.2 85 The United States, however, must realize
that some countries are opposed to any type of economic sanctions be-
cause the costs of such an action to their own economies are high.2 8 6
Therefore, the United States should encourage mutual agreements with
other nations to collectively combat terrorism through asset freezes.
CONCLUSION
In Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., Bankers Trust
Company had to honor the Libyan demands for repayment of the
Eurodollar account. The repayment was not illegal under English law,
the proper substantive law governing the Eurodollar deposit contract.
Furthermore, the repayment did not necessitate actions in an illegal
forum. This decision acted as a deterrent for countries wishing to in-
voke asset freezes of Eurodollar accounts in the future. Even though
the mechanism of repayment ordinarily occurs in the United States
through CHIPS, countries will rely on this decision and require alter-
native methods of repayment to the depositor. Finally, if the United
States invokes an asset freeze in the future, it should raise the IMF
defense if the country where the Eurodollar account is located supports
a broad interpretation of article VIII, section 2(b).
POSTSCRIPT
In Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. "Bankers Trust Co., Bankers Trust
Company opted to forego an appeal to the British Court of Appeal.28
284. Id. at 125; cf. Carswell, supra note 281, at 264-65 (noting the minimal effects
of a United States unilateral asset freeze without obtaining multilateral support).
285. See Financial Times, Sept. 25, 1987, at 6, col. 2 (raising the possibility of
combatting terrorism through the assistance of all countries in the support of asset
freezes).
286. Wash. Post, Jan. 9, 1986, at AI5, col. 1; see Wall St. J., Jan. 9, 1986, at 25,
col. 1 (describing the resistance of Asian, Moslem, and Communist countries to the use
of economic sanctions as a deterrent measure against terrorism). After President Rea-
gan froze Libyan assets in overseas branches of United States banks, he recognized the
need for the multilateral cooperation of the European Community in his fight against
international terrorism. President Reagan's Interview with European Journalists of
January 10, 1986, 22 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 41 (Jan. 20, 1986).
287. Wall St. J., Oct. 13, 1987, at 31, col. 1.
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In addition, on October 10, 1987, the United States Treasury Depart-
ment issued a license to Bankers Trust Company, permitting it to repay
$320.1 million28 8 to the LAFB.2 89 Because the Treasury Department
issued a special license to Bankers Trust Company, the bank did not
violate United States law under the Libyan Sanctions Regulations in
making the repayment. 90 The Treasury Department issued the license
to Bankers Trust without a public explanation. 91
288. See id. (noting that the $292 million sum represented the deposits owed to the
LAFB and the remainder represented interest owed to the plaintiff).
289. Id.
290. 31 C.F.R. § 550.209 (1987).
291. Wall St. J., Oct. 13, 1987, at 31, col. 1.
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